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ABSTRACT

Direct Democracy and State Legislatures: Does Professionalism Matter?

by
Donald D. Mirjanian
Dr. David Fott, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor o f Political Science
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis seeks to improve our understanding o f the relationship between state
legislative professionalism and direct democracy.

Using institutionalist theory as a

framework, I employ negative binomial regression to measure frequency changes in
statewide ballot initiatives (1990-2000) as a function o f state legislative professionalism.
I find that increased professionalism is associated with higher levels o f ballot initiatives
appearing on statewide ballots, after controlling for qualification difficulty, interest group
strength, divided government, and demographic variables.
While the conclusions may not provide insight as to the long-term (or short-term, for
that matter) quality o f the initiatives or referenda, they do provide insight as to when the
citizenry is more likely to eschew one fundamental component o f American government
- representative democracy - in favor o f what has quickly become another important
component o f American government - direct democracy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the influence o f state-level legislative professionalism on the
institution o f direct democracy. Although considerable scholarship exists on both the
subject o f state legislatures and direct democracies, a lacuna o f sorts exists in literature
examining the confluence o f these two institutions. Given the prevalence o f direct
democracy in the American states, as well as the importance o f the state legislature, an
exploration o f this subject is warranted. This study seeks to further our understanding of
the relationship between the two institutions by examining the conditions under which
increased initiative activity takes place. More specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the
following question:

how does legislative professionalism influence the institution of

direct democracy?
State legislatures have undergone significant changes in the last several decades.
Considered by one observer to be in earlier generations a “racist, sexist, secretive, bossruled, malapportioned and uninformed” institution (Ehrenhalt 1992), legislatures o f today
are often characterized by longer sessions, increases in pay and benefits, increased
staffing, and modem facilities (Hickock 1992). Wide variations exist in the levels of
professionalization among states, with some states having a “full-time” legislature, while
others meet for just a short time every other year. Legislative professionalism has been
found to be correlated with increased contact with representatives (Squire 1993),
1

increases in legislator diversity, decreases in occupational diversity among legislators
(Squire 1992), and perhaps most importantly for this thesis, increased autonomy in
initiating policies (Thompson 1986). Legislative professionalism has also been associated
with higher levels o f incumbency reelection (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000)
as well as divided government (Fiorina 1994, but see also Squire 1997).
The confluence o f state legislatures and direct democracy is natural; the outcomes,
however, are complex. Simply put, direct democracy is an access point for the citizenry
(or more likely, interest groups) to circumvent the state legislatures; but Gerber (1996,
1998) argues that interest groups may propose initiatives simply for the indirect effects
on the legislature: given the correct circumstances, a group may be able to influence the
legislature into acting without having to actually have success with their initiatives.
Overall, state legislatures can be a major source o f policy outcomes in a state, but, given
the right conditions, state legislatures can also be a major source o f policy gridlock.
In its modem form, direct democracy was conceived o f as a method by which citizens
could directly “check” the state legislature (and more specifically, powerful economic
interests) by placing issues directly on the ballot. In so doing, the founders o f this
movement purposefully created a mechanism by which they could circumvent the very
stmcture o f American government: representative democracy. As the institutions
formalized, questions emerged about the efficacy and viability o f such mechanisms:
clearly, it could produce results - but did the mechanism remain tme to the founding
principles? Nor was this potential paradox unforeseen: as early as 1894, editors o f the
Political Science Quarterly considered the populist rhetoric that was becoming
widespread, and questioned how the “organization required will differ from that o f our
present ‘machines’” (Burgess 1894, 579).
2

Gerber (1999) considered this question directly when she considered the possibility o f
a “populist paradox”: the notion that present-day powerful economic interest groups may
have co-opted from the electorate the very process that was meant to be an equalizing
force. She finds that this is not the case: for the most part, wealthy interest groups are
better able to maintain the status quo rather than alter it. Other scholars agree: Donovan,
et al (1998) find that in interest-group based competition between broad-based interest
groups and narrow-interest economic groups (e.g., trial lawyers, insurance companies),
the broad-based interest groups are more likely to succeed in altering the status quo,
while the narrow-interest groups are more successful at maintaining it. Though left
implicit in their arguments, these findings do not preclude a paradox; they simply
preclude the paradox that was deemed most likely to occur. That is, the ability o f wellheeled special interest groups to routinely maintain the status quo against groups wishing
to change it still represents what could be considered co-opting, though not in the manner
widely believed.
Original advocates o f the process argued that the initiative and referenda process
would invariably increase turnout levels, as well as result in a better-educated electorate
(Beard 1912; Haynes 1907; U ’Ren 1907). Recent findings on this subject are mixed.
Everson (1981) argues that while the initiative process may positively affect turnout in
special circumstances, a general, long term positive impact is unlikely. Conversely, other
scholars agree that the presence o f the initiative and referenda increase voter turnout
levels (Smith, M. 2001; Southwell 2001; Tolbert 2001; Tolbert and Smith, D. 2005), as
well as the presence of interest groups (Boehmke 2005). Additionally, scholars have
argued that citizens in direct democracy states have higher levels o f political awareness
and civic abilities than do citizens in noninitiative states (Smith, M. 2002; Tolbert and
3

Smith, D. 2005). Policy outcomes have been found to be more responsive (Gerber 1996;
Matsusaka 2000; but see also Cambreco 1998 and Lascher 1996) to public opinion.
Finally, direct democracy campaigns have been cited as influencing the overall political
agenda (Makin 2006; McDonald 2004; Nicholson 2005).
As has been shown, outcomes o f direct democracy may not always be in line with the
expectations o f the founders. Tax-and-expenditure related initiatives were, and still are
today, among the most common initiatives appearing on the ballot'; however, in yet
another unexpected outcome o f direct democracy, voters intent on taking matters into
their own hands and voting directly to lower taxes and constrain spending may have, in
many cases, lowered the quality o f life for the citizens o f their state, including decreased
education funding and social services (Schrag 1998). At the same time, citizens o f the
states that have passed tax and expenditure limitations are often subject to increased user
fees (as well as special-districts), that are not found in non-initiative states (Matsusaka
1995, 2000; Bowler and Donovan 2004).
Additionally, the relationship between minorities and direct democracy is seemingly
paradoxical. Modem scholars argue that direct democracy may actually promote majority
tyranny against minority rights, especially in the cases o f housing and public
accommodations for racial minorities, school desegregation, gay rights, and English-only
laws (Gamble 1997). Moreover, in a sort o f irony-within-an-irony, non-minorities have
turned to the initiative process in an effort to actually maintain a status quo that had been
threatened by minority-led (or influenced) state legislatures (Tolbert and Hero 1998).

^ Tolbert (2001) finds that during the period o f 1900-1920, 22% o f all initiatives were
concerned with tax, revenue, or spending; her analysis o f the period o f 1980-1996 shows
that similar initiative types also represented 22% of all initiatives appearing on ballots.

Thus, it is not surprising that the study o f direct democracy in America has led to
some confusing outcomes. The present work attempts to disentangle some o f the
confusion that accompanies the study o f direct democracy by reviewing and evaluating
the literature from the early part of the century (when the institution was enjoying
widespread installation) forward in an effort to determine how well the expectations and
anticipations of the founders o f this movement have proven accurate. Using the
expectations o f the founders o f my point o f departure, I seek to evaluate the institution in
its current state within the context o f original expectations. That is, by reviewing the
salient issues providing motivation to the supporters o f direct democracy, as well as the
arguments in opposition to the process, I propose to realign the arguments over the
efficacy o f the process such that the present state o f direct democracy can be evaluated in
the terms originally outlined by its founders. These salient issues include the role of
special-interest groups in the process, the educative effects o f direct democracy, and the
role o f the state legislature in providing responsive (and responsible) policies.

The

current role of interest groups in the process, as well as the educative effects, will be
evaluated based solely on the literature (both past and present) within the discipline;
however, the final ehapters of this thesis present original quantitative analysis regarding
perhaps the most salient (and often overlooked) issue in direct democracy: state
legislative influence. In particular, I undertake an institutionalist analysis o f direct
democracy in America in an effort to answer the following question: what is the influence
o f state legislative professionalism on the frequency and types o f initiatives that appear
on statewide ballots.

Thesis Outline
This introductory chapter has briefly considered the institution of direct
democracy in America, the notion o f legislative professionalism, and in particular, how
institutionalist theory may be used as a model in explaining the relationship between
direct democracy, state legislatures, and political actors. The following chapter introduces
the institutionalist theory and its relevance to the process o f direct democracy, and
concludes by defining the relevant terms used throughout the thesis.
The third chapter focuses on the foundations o f direct democracy hy evaluating
relevant arguments presented by the “founders” o f this institution: the Populists and the
Progressives. I will also consider some o f the more salient issues within the institution o f
direct democracy, as well as the role o f the state legislature in the policymaking process.
The fourth chapter discusses the variables that will populate the statistical model, as
well as formulates the hypotheses to he tested. In particular, I present a pooled, crosssectional data set consisting o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots from 1990-2000
to be used in formulating the dependent variable. I also discuss the usefulness o f several
different indices measuring state legislative professionalism before presenting the most
beneficial index to the work at hand. Additionally, several important control variables are
introduced: interest group strength, ballot initiative qualification difficulty, state
population, state-level gross domestic product, as well as controls for divided
govermnent, state-level political ideology, and political culture.
The model specified here is created to test two central hypotheses. Drawing on the
central tenets o f the institutionalist theory, I first hypothesize that increased legislative
professionalism will result in an increase in the overall number o f initiatives appearing on
statewide ballots. Secondly, I hypothesize that increased state legislative professionalism
6

will result in increases among various types o f initiatives, such as economic-based
initiatives, initiatives dealing with social and moral issues, as well as those concerned
with the governmental process.
The fifth chapter reports the results o f the data analysis. Briefly, support for the
hypotheses under investigation is found. In particular, I find that increases in legislative
professionalism are associated with higher levels o f ballot initiative activity, even after
controlling for several relevant variables, such as qualification difficulty and state
population. However, limited support is found for the notion that increases in legislative
professionalism are associated with decreased levels o f certain types o f initiatives.
The final chapter o f the thesis discusses the results o f the statistical analysis within
the context of the institutionalist theory. In particular, I argue that the institutionalist
theory suggests that institutions constrain the actions o f political actors, and that the
notion of institutional dynamism suggests that veto points occur within these institutions.
Political actors pursue their agenda by exploiting these veto points, and such veto points
become apparent at different levels o f legislative professionalism across states, and
especially within the context o f several other variables. I conclude by noting that,
together, these components serve as explanatory predictors o f direct democracy usage in
America.

CHAPTER 2

INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The wide range of policies present on statewide ballots suggests that those seeking to
change the status quo in any given, area have the process available to them. Further,
scholars suggest that the use o f the initiative is a primary, direct determinant in many
issues in states that have the initiative process, and because o f policy diffusion, it often
affects policy in states that do not have the process (Bowler and Donovan 1998).
Moreover, the confluence of state legislatures and interest groups with the institution of
direct democracy suggests that the structure of each o f these institutions affects the other
in a given political setting. Given the dynamics o f the institutions involved,
institutionalist theory provides an appropriate contextual framework with which to
evaluate direct democracy in America.
Institutionalist theory has long served as a theoretical explanation within the
discipline o f political science; indeed, scholars have updated the framework to such a
degree

that

“new

institutionalism”

has

developed

separately

from

historical

institutionalism. In their seminal work on institutionalist theory, Thelen and Steinmo
(1992) stress that institutionalism includes both formal organizations and informal rules
and procedures that structure conduct.
In general, institutionalists are “interested in the whole range o f state and societal
institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their

relations o f power to other groups” and more specifically, historical institutionalists argue
that institutions “constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole cause of the
outcome ’’(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). New institutionalism, as the name suggests, is
similar in many ways in that the focus remains on how institutions themselves shape
politics, but focuses less on the administrative, legal, and political structures that were
once studied in a highly normative way and more on the “relational character” of
institutions, or “how a given institutional configuration shapes political interactions”
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 6).
A significant dilemma regarding historical institutionalism is that the focus is often on
continuity, and not change. This is due mainly to the structural paradox that exists: while
the notion o f punctuated equilibrium as a method of change enjoys widespread
acceptance, Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 6) note that institutions are the independent
variable in explaining political outcomes in times o f stability, but then become the
dependent variable predicted by the very political maneuverings they once predicted
themselves. The authors argue that by focusing on the sources “institutional dynamism,”
(an integral part o f new institutionalism) researchers will be able to “look at how
institutions mediate and filter politics [and also] turn the question around to demonstrate
how the impact of institutions is itself mediated by the broader political context (Thelen
and Steimno 1992:16).
More specifically, the authors focus on four sources of institutional dynamism: first,
broad changes in the socioeconomic or political context can produce a situation in which
previously latent institutions suddenly become salient, with implications for political
outcomes; secondly, changes in socioeconomic or political balance of power can produce
a situation in which old institutions are put in service o f different ends, as new actors
9

come into play who pursue their new goals through existing institutions; third, exogenous
changes can produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing
institutions: changes in outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old
institutions; and finally, political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in
the institutions themselves.
Another way o f conceptualizing change within the institutionalist framework is
through the exploration o f “veto points.” In particular, this helps to illustrate the
relational character o f institutions in that the veto points provide “strategic openings”
(facilitated by institutions) that actors use to achieve their goals. As defined by Thelen
and Steinmo, “veto points” are areas o f institutional vulnerability. The attractiveness of
institutional vulnerability, particularly for interest groups, is that it presents a sort of
“chip in the armor” o f the policy process, whereby mobilization can effectively influence
the policy process, whether by modifying the status quo or thwarting new policy
innovations. Perhaps most importantly, Thelen and Steinmo argue that while veto points
may be “sticky,” there are not permanent, and shifts in the overall balance o f power can
cause veto points to emerge, disappear, or shift their locations, which in turn provides the
aforementioned “strategic openings” that actors may use to achieve their goals.
In real terms, the authors argue that this concept explains why similar interest groups
(conceptualized in terms o f organizational power) may have different results in different
settings. For example, Immergut (1990) analyzes healthcare-based interest groups in
three countries, and while equally well-organized and powerful, all had varying degrees
o f success. For Immergut, the successful transition to socialized medicine was not
necessarily the result o f successful interest groups in and o f themselves (in spite of
various veto groups) but rather different veto points within political institutions. Such
10

conceptualization requires a brief overview o f the notion o f change within the
institutionalist theory.
The adoption o f this theoretical explanation for sub-national research is based mainly
on its explanatory value in dealing with a multi-institutionalist political arena.

Thus,

considering state legislatures, interest groups, and direct democracy within the
institutionalist theory appears to be an appropriate fit, especially insofar as the four
sources o f dynamism are a commonality within the institution of direct democracy. For
example, the resurgence of direct democracy in the 1970s and 1980s can he attributed to
broad changes in the socioeconomic (the rise of the anti-tax movement) as well as the
political context (decreased trust in government due to Watergate); secondly, changes in
the balance o f power o f state governments (as well as interest groups) have produced a
situation in which old institutions are put in service o f different ends and new actors
pursue new goals within those institutions (e.g., direct democracy goals of tax and
expenditure limitations; governance policy issues, such as term limits and campaignfmance reform). Third, exogenous changes have produced a shift in goals or strategies
pursued hy “old” actors within existing institutions (e.g., the case o f non-minorities using
direct democracy to maintain the status quo against minority-influenced legislatures, as
discussed above); and finally, political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate
changes in the institution themselves, as seen with the discussion regarding the indirect
influence o f initiatives (led by resourceful interest groups) on state legislatures. Clearly,
the examples provided here are hut a few o f the many possible ways in which
institutional dynamism is exemplified by the process o f direct democracy. Thus, the
theory provides a clear foundation for further examination o f the institutions o f direct
democracy, as well as state legislatures.
11

Definition o f Terms
The terms involved with direct democracy are, for the most part, terms used in
common parlance, and need little clarification. However, it may be useful to briefly
define some terms that will be used throughout this thesis, as well as provide a brief
overview o f the current usage of direct democracy in America today.
Direct democracy refers to the process o f initiative, referenda, and recall. Though the
term “direct legislation” is often used interchangeably with “direct democracy,” this term
refers only to the process o f the initiative and referenda, and not the recall. For the
purposes o f this thesis, I use the term direct democracy to refer only to the initiative,
referenda and recall, though the statistical analysis undertaken here deals only with the
initiative.
The “initiative” refers the process o f proposing a measure for an upcoming ballot,
after meeting the state-mandated threshold for signatures via petition (which often
include both quantity and geographic restrictions^), placing a measure on a ballot to be
voted on by the people in a regular election. Initiatives take four forms; the direct
constitutional amendment initiative, the indirect constitutional amendment initiative, the
direct statute initiative, and the indirect statute initiative. In the cases of either the direct
constitutional amendment or the direct statute initiative, the proposal is placed directly
(without any action by the state legislature) on the ballot for approval or rejection after
successfully meeting the signature requirements o f the state. In the cases of the indirect
options, the measures are (after meeting the mandated signature requirements) submitted

^ Quantity restrictions generally refer to a threshold based upon a certain percentage of
the voters in the last general election; geographic restrictions generally refer to the
requirement that the signatures come from a certain percentage o f counties or districts
within a given state. This will be fully developed in later chapters.
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to a regular state legislative session prior to going before the voters. If the state legislature
does not approve the initiative, the measure is placed on the ballot in the next election;
additionally, the state legislature may offer a substitute proposal on the same subject
(Magelby 1984).
The “referendum” refers to the process in which citizens may accept or reject laws
proposed by the state legislature. There are two types o f referendum; the popular
referendum and the legislative referendum. In the former, citizens must gather the statemandated number o f signatures on a petition in order to have the referendum placed on
the ballot; in the latter, the legislature (or perhaps a government official or agency) places
the measure directly on the ballot for the people to accept or reject. All states have the
legislative referendum; in many cases, proposals are required to be submitted to the
people for approval. However, the popular referendum is only available in twenty-four
states (Initiative and Referendum Institute, online).

Direct Democracy Usage in America
Currently, twenty-four states have the initiative process (see Table 1.1); o f these,
eighteen have the constitutional amendment initiative process, and o f those, sixteen use
the direct method and two use the indirect method. Twenty-one o f the twenty-four states
have only the statutory initiative process available; o f those, fourteen use the direct
method while nine allow the indirect method^ (Initiative and Referendum Institute,
online).

^ This discrepancy is caused by Washington and Utah, who allow for both the indirect
and direct statutory initiative process.
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Table 1.1 - Initiatives, Popular Referendum, and Types o f Initiatives Used By States

In itia tiv e

WEST
Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming
New Mexico

D ir e c t

In direct

D irect

Indirect

R e fer e n d u m

In itiative

In itiative

A m e n d m en t

A m e n d m en t

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
---

MIDWEST
Arkansas
Illinois
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Kentucky

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

24

24

---

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

-------

-----------

---

X

---

X
X
X

-------

-------

---

---

---

---

X

X

---

X

-----

-----

X

X
X
X

-------

—

---

---

---

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

---------

---

---

---

---

X
---

---

X
X

-----

---

——

---

-—

X
X
X

r

X
X
X

-----

---

X

X
X

---

-----

X
X
X

---

X
---

---

---

X
X
X

---

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

---

EAST
Florida
Maine
Mass
Maryland
Total

P o p u la r

14

9

14

-----

---

---

X
---

16

2

Direct democracy has undergone identifiable usage cycles in American history. In the
early days o f the process, the initiative and referenda were used quite frequently; the first
full decade between 1911 and 1920 saw 293 initiatives, while just three decades later,
between 1951-60, usage dropped to just 114 statewide initiatives placed nationwide.
Scholars argue that the success o f California’s widely popular (and highly touted)
Proposition 13 in 1978 and Proposition 4 in 1979"^ were largely responsible for the
increase in the process (and in particular, in anti-tax proposals) in the next several
decades.

Iiiitiiitive Use Bv Deciule, 1901-2000
I 450
I 400
! 350
I
I 300

I :50
!

200

150
100

50
0

I

I I I

Figure 1: Initiative Use By Decade, I90I-2000

" Proposition 13 reduced California local property taxes; Proposition 4 placed
constitutional restrictions on state spending. Together, they constitute the first o f what
would become many tax-and-expenditure limitations placed on state governments.
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Examination o f initiative and referenda from the period o f 1992-2004 confirms this.
O f the 441 initiatives passed in this period, 76 (or 17%) were concerned with taxes; while
another 26 (6%) were concerned with the governmental process. Term limits constituted
another 58 (13%), giving the impression that the citizenry was not opposed to the notion
o f placing limits on their state governments (though this notion coincides with the unique
individualistic culture o f Western states, a topic to be discussed later). Environmental
reform measures (8%) are also frequently placed on state ballots, as are education (6%)
and gaming initiatives (7%).
Thus, it is clear that the usage o f direct democracy in America is on the rise.
However, before examining the influence o f state legislative professionalism on the
institution o f direct democracy, it may be useful to examine the development o f direct
democracy in America over the past century.
next chapter.
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Such an examination is the focus o f the

CHAPTER 3

DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century brought tremendous ehanges to the
American system o f government in the form o f direct democracy. This “founding” of
direct democracy in America can be considered a function o f several components: the
deleterious effects o f the Industrial Revolution on many o f the farmers and ranchers in
America; the desire on the part o f Progressives and Populists to install a mechanism that
could “check” the powerful hold o f special-interest groups over state legislatures; and the
widely-held desire to improve government by making it “more responsive” to the people
in general - which would in turn, the Progressives argued, lead to a more politically
efficacious citizenry, which would again in turn, lead to a better overall government.
Here I explore the founding o f direct democracy in an attempt to elucidate the
arguments that scholars provided during the infancy o f this movement. I begin by briefly
introducing the Progressive and Populist movements, and the similarities and differences
between them. A brief overview o f the initial installation process in the individual states
follows. I continue by examining the arguments both in favor o f and in opposition to the
process, and focus in particular on the salient issues regarding the process that still exist
today, such as the role o f interest groups in the process, the issue o f state legislative
responsiveness, and also the “educative” effects of the process on the citizenry. I then
examine the arguments o f present-day scholars in an effort to determine how well the
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institution has developed within the expectations o f its “founders.” The purpose o f this
discussion is to equate the important issues o f the founding era o f direct legislation with
the important issues o f the present-day version o f the institution and determine which of
those have been resolved, which have remained tumultuous, and which have developed
anew.

By understanding the evolution o f the issues from the founding through the

present day, the quantitative analysis that follows in later chapters will be more robust.
That is, by contextualizing the issues in this manner, we can more fully understand the
importance o f interest groups, the educative effects o f direct democracy, and the
influence o f the state legislature on the institution o f direct democracy.

Populists, Progressives, and the Founding o f an Institution
A useful starting point when considering the founding o f almost any American
institution is the works o f the framers of the Constitution. In particular, many scholars
point to M adison’s arguments against the concept o f direct democracy in Federalist 10
(Polhill 2001; Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998). Clearly, they are relevant:
Madison argues in the former that a group o f individuals, united by common passion or
interest, can be a serious threat to the interests o f the community as a whole: “ .. .it may be
concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number
o f citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit o f no cure
for the mischief o f faction.” The only way to check this, o f course, is via a republic; a
representative government that “refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public view s...under [which]
the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant
to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves” (Federalist 10).

IS

If the Founders set the American “train” on a particular track, then the Populists
sought to apply the brakes nearly a century later. Convinced that the “train” was in
perpetual motion and quite clearly on the wrong track, the Populists began in the 1890s to
propose a series o f governmental and social reforms (Cain and Miller 2001; Polhill
2001). Though vitally important to the development o f America, the Industrial
Revolution was not a prosperous time for all Americans. In particular, farmers, ranchers,
and laborers, stood to suffer immensely by the commercialization o f agriculture and the
concentration o f capital that became hallmarks o f the period. In the late 1800s,
disenchanted groups (mainly alliances o f farmers, miners, and laborers) formed the
People’s (or Populist) Party, favoring governmental ownership o f railroads, elimination
o f monopolies, a graduated income tax, free coinage of silver, an expanded money
supply, and similar efforts aimed at improving the livelihood o f rural families (Cronin
1989, 43). With bankers, railroaders, and land speculators in their sights, the Populists
attempted to enter politics and change the system, as they could envision gaining little
relief from the two main political parties that they believed were controlled by the
influence o f railroads, trusts, and monopolies. In 1892, the Populists codified their beliefs
at their first national convention, where they introduced a platform that called for the
direct election o f senators, limiting the president and vice-president to a single term, and
most importantly for our purposes, the introduction o f the initiative and referendum
(Cronin 1989).
That Populism constituted radicalism is not easily refuted; that the Populist Party
sought minor changes in the governmental system is. Faced with little alternative - after
all, the Frontier had been conquered and no longer could individuals just “go West” - the
Farmer’s Alliance sought to fight back against both their government and nature. As
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Barens (2004) points out, a catalyst for the Populist revolt was a drought-fed deflationary
period beginning in 1887 which saw massive foreclosures resulting from earlier credit
extensions and speculation-buying. After a decade o f misery, it was clear to them that
big business interests had control o f the government, but this was just the start: for
Populists, “individualism alone was not enough to secure democracy in an industrial era”,
so they sought governmental intervention to “return authority to the people, in whom they
had complete faith and trust” (Barens 2004, 54).
The Populist desire to put the elite few who had corrupted the public good back into
their place was, in their minds, best accomplished by the government; thus, the purpose
was to seek a redress of grievances and not a revolution. However, the institutionalist
structure was at the heart o f the problem, and they sought to directly supplant state
legislatures with the initiative and referendum (Barens 2004). In so doing, the Populists
sought to put the people - and not the institutions, such as parties and legislatures - in
control o f the government, and thereby restore sovereignty to the people. In this way,
Barens argues, the movement was not so much economically driven, but ideologically
driven.
The early days o f the Populist Party proved mildly successful. In 1892, Populist
candidate and Civil War veteran James B. Weaver collected just over eight percent o f the
popular vote, and twenty-two electoral votes, though well short o f the 223 needed to win
(McKenna 1974). For many, however, the Populist Party agenda was excessive: the push
for nationalization o f industries and thorough overhaul o f the currency, lending, and
banking structures exceeded the more simplistic notions o f restoring economic

20

opportunity^ (Zisk 1987), and by 1896, the party was dissolved. While a platform based
on mechanisms that would ultimately (and purposefully) increase inflation was in and of
itself a difficult way to gain widespread support, other factors may have led to their early
demise. McKenna (1974) argues that “platform ambiguity” was the result o f a lack o f
cohesion, and in particular, the lack o f an identifiable doctrine or ideology that could be
articulated and defended. However, it was ultimately an 1896 decision to fuse with the
Democrats by endorsing William Jennings Bryan that proved the fatal mistake. This
decision, McKenna (1974) argues, led to the destruction o f the Populist Party image o f an
independent party, and with it came the unraveling o f many o f the reform notions that
had once defined the Party; indeed, by this time, the Populist Party was focused almost
exclusively on the “free silver” appendage o f its platform. Bryan’s success in the rural
West was not enough to carry him to victory, and the Populist Party came to an abrupt
end.
Because Populism was not an economically motivated movement, but rather an
ideological movement (Barens 2004), perhaps Riker’s (1988) contribution adds a further
dimension in understanding the demise o f the party. Riker argues that a fundamental flaw
with Populism exists within the notion o f a “popular will,” which is singularly
unattainable. Riker explains that it is unattainable because the only way to determine
what the people want is through voting, and voting simply tells us which alternative wins
- and it cannot be determined that the “winning” choice represents the “popular will”
more than the losing choice - and this case remains the same even over time. Moreover,

^ “Opportunity” in this sense refers to the notion o f equality o f opportunity, in the sense
that advantage should be open to all; assessments are made on the basis o f merit, success
is based generally on being the most qualified, given a fair competition.
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Riker argues that in order for the Populist desire to be realized, the government itself
must implement the popular will. This, Riker argues, may preclude governments from
respecting both minority and majority groups, and also leaves open the possibility that the
institutions that constitute a liberal democracy (e.g., elections, and even constitutions)
could be ignored in pursuit of a goal determined to be the “true will” o f the people (Riker

1988).
The notions o f the Populists did not die with the party; indeed. Populist notions are
perennial. Indeed, Hicks (1931) argued that while the Populist notion regarding banking
and currency was often regarded as “lunacy,” the adoption o f the Federal Reserve Board
system by President Wilson in 1914 showed that the “Populist diagnosis had been
accepted and the Populist prescription had not been wholly ignored” (Hicks 1931, 23).
Additionally, the Populist belief that the government should operate private agricultural
storage locations (so that prices could be stabilized over a longer period o f time) was
realized by the Warehouse Act o f 1916; the Hepburn Act o f 1906, the Mann-Elkins Act
o f 1910 and the Transportation Act o f 1920 all placed the Interstate Commerce
Commission in a much stronger position to regulate rail transportation (Hicks 1931, 25).
Central to this thesis, the adoption o f the initiative and referenda in over two dozen states
also supports the notion that while the Populist Party may have been short-lived, the ideas
within bore fruit for decades to come.
Thus, it seems clear that the Populist Party was in many ways initially responsible
for direct democracy in America, though the actual reforms did not take place until well
after the Party’s demise in 1896. As Mowry argues, “ ...without Populism, Progressivism
could not have existed when it did...the lingering Populist reform spirit in the Midwest
and the South provided Progressivism with many o f the votes necessary for the national
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majority needed for the passage o f its reform measures” (Mowry 1972: 34). Over the next
several years the Populist platform was refined; while many of the same themes were
present, the movement was now seemingly more legitimate: “insurgency has ceased to be
a mere uprising o f guerillas: it has become a great, a well-regulated, a self-conscious
progressive movement” (Baker 1910, 4).
Progressives, like Populists, argued for “fairer distribution o f the economic and
political power o f the nation” (Barens 2004, 76), and also believed that many o f the
problems in American life were based on the unchecked growth o f large corporations and
capital accumulation. Progressives sought to “face squarely the social problems left in
the wake o f the industrial revolution and to solve them with the inventiveness
characteristic o f industrial society” (Resek 1967). The notion that the government should
take a larger role in protecting the interests o f the people was formed into the progressive
desire for an enlarged - and more professional - bureaucracy; it was in this way, they
argued, that experienced and responsible professionals could act on behalf o f “the
people” (Barens 2004).
By and large, the Populism-tumed-Progressivism saw tremendous successes,
especially with the backing o f legitimate political actors, such as Theodore Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson. Significant legislation was passed augmenting the role o f government
in business (especially in the Plains states) and politically, widespread establishment of
the initiative and referenda, along with the constitutional amendment providing for the
direct election o f senators, became woven into the fabric o f American life, along with an
institutionalized bureaucracy (Barens 2004). Other scholars argue that “the Progressive
Era forged a link between theory and practice that had not been evident since the age of
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Jackson...both economic and political reform translated prevalent ideas into laws and
institutions” (Mason and Baker 1985, 560).
The Progressive movement as a whole was not without its detractors. The very idea
of a “progressive movement” was a misnomer to Hollingsworth (1912), who argued that
the movement towards direct democracy was not progressive, but actually regressive.
Though his argument implies an understanding that direct democracy and representative
government would not coexist, but rather, the former was intended to replace the latter,
Hollingsworth argues that such a movement signified a return to pre-modem conditions,
methods, and systems, and as such, disregarded the success (and thus, progress) o f the
current constitutional system o f government, which Hollingsworth argues evolved from
the very system that the “progressives” were trying to return to - and furthermore, had
evolved from the final downfall o f this type o f government.
Less convincingly, the author also argues that the movement does not meet the
threshold that its propagators laid down: that the institution o f direct democracy is allinclusive; that it was meant to make the voice o f the masses heard. In effect, he argues
that because it is in the interest o f the masses, or the “plain people,” it is effectively a
class-based movement designed to exclude the “determining or controlling voice on the
part o f the smaller class who are identified with the large economic interests o f the
country” (Hollingsworth, 1912). He further argues that this is a contradiction to the ideals
o f the American Constitution, which he parenthetically notes applied to the “whole o f the
country’s citizen population.” Missing in his analysis, however, is the notion that at the
time o f his writing, women had yet to be nationally recognized as enfranchised;
moreover, African Americans had not held that right for very long, and thus “the whole
o f the population” seems a problematic tema.
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Hollingsworth further argues that for all o f the “progressive measures,” (e.g., the
direct primary, the initiative, and the recall), the electorate is not provided with any new
politieal power or funetions: it is still limited to - as it has been under the representative
system - voting. The author questions the veracity o f the supporting view that direct
democracy is an “absolute form o f government by the people” insofar as this form o f
government still has individuals who “enact laws, construe them, and administer them”
and that this power is still delegated, “whether it be aetual or implied” (Hollingsworth
1912,39).
Improperly named as they may have been, their movement was quite real. Moreover,
el ear differenees between the Populists and Progressives existed. Mowry (1972) argues
that “Progressivism differed sharply from Populism in the loeus o f support, in the nature
o f its leadership, and in the amplitude o f its ends” (Mowry 1972, 5). In particular.
Progressives were often focused on urban problems rather than agricultural issues (and
thus, drew a broader base of support than Populists); the Progressive was more likely to
eome from an edueated middle-elass family, and the Progressive leaders were, as Mowry
argues, “most often from an elite class...and often aware o f it” (Mowry 1972). Hofstadter
(1955) agrees, noting that intellectuals and professionals had profound roles in
Progressivism. Thus, while the Populists eschewed the two major parties because of
doubts regarding their efficaey. Progressives often sought ends that were simply
unrelated to the party platforms - and often centered on the reform o f individual habits
and morals (Mowry 1972).
Cain and Miller (2001) point out that the differences between the Populists and
Progressives are both important and rarely analyzed. They argue that the main difference
between the two is that the Populists sought to undermine representative government
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completely, while the Progressives sought many o f the same reforms - such as direct
democracy - but in an effort to “liberalize representative government from corrupt
forces” (Cain and Miller 2001, 36). In other words, the Progressives were well aware o f
the problem o f political machines, hardships caused by rapid industrialization efforts, and
the immutable strengths o f corrupt corporate and partisan interests. However, instead of
the Populist notion o f a eomplete restrueturing (which would have included substituting
direct democracy for state legislatures) the Progressives believed not only in the
importance of, but also the competence of, the state legislatures and sought direct
democraey as simply as a proeedural supplement to the existing order; it was to be a
mechanism by which the people eould eheck the influenee o f the special interests on the
state legislatures. Along with direet demoeraey, the direet primary, the direct election of
senators, and extending suffrage to women would all work together to promote a better
government (Cain and Miller 2001). Indeed, for many Progressives, the motivation for
direct democracy lay in the “insulation” o f the administration o f govermnent from
political forces - in effeet, leaving the policy choices to the people via direct democracy
and the administration o f poliey choices to the government (Magelby 1984). Thus, in
addition to the measures mentioned above, along with merit systems, nonpartisan
elections,

commission plan for local governments,

and independent regulatory

commissions, the initiative, popular referenda and recall would allow the “Progressive
doctrine o f trust in the individual citizen” to overcome economic trusts, monopolies, and
cartels that mainly worked through politicians, parties, and state legislatures (Magelby

1984).
This distinction is often overlooked in the literature. Indeed, in other works
published in the same year, the groups are referred to as the Populist/Progressives (Polhill
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2001). Although Cain and Miller give little backing to their argument, the notion that two
groups may have wanted to use the initiative for two different purposes makes intuitive
sense. The notion continues today, and the Cain and Miller framework may provide a
useful method o f categorizing initiatives over and above the traditional “broad based” or
“narrow-material” methodologies used recently (Donovan, et al 1998; Ernst 2001).
Clearly, other typologies exist: social, governmental reform, environmental, regulatory,
etc.; however, these may not capture as clearly as does the Progressive/Populist
distinction o f whether or not the purpose o f the initiative is to undermine the
representative system in place, or to strengthen it via enhanced responsiveness or
professionalism.
These differences between the Progressives and the Populists, at least in terms o f
their diverging views regarding the role o f the state legislatures, may be illustrated by
considering different types o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots today.
Specifically, many initiatives today seek to answer questions regarding policy decisions
that state legislatures are unable or unwilling to deal with. In this case, depending on how
the issue is framed, the state legislature is either not fulfilling its mandate, or it is seeking
the advice o f the people on the subject. In either case, the institution o f direct democracy
is working as a supplement to the legislature, and is well within the Progressive ideals.
However, in other cases, initiatives seek to alter the governmental process at the
structural level. Instances in which initiatives restrict the legislative sessions themselves,
restrict the tax and expenditure levels of state governments, or seek term limits are in a
sense, seeking not to supplement representative democracy, but to supplant it - a notion
much more in line with the Populist legacy. In these cases, the objective is not to assist
the legislative process; rather, the objective is to fundamentally alter the process. While
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the overall mission is not to remove the legislatures, it is the objective o f these initiatives
to severely constrain and control the process by which state governments function.
The Adoption o f Initiative and Referenda in the States
In 1897, South Dakota became the birthplace o f direct democracy in the United
States with the submission o f a constitutional amendment by the state legislature. The
amendment succinctly stated that while legislative “shall be vested in a bicameral
legislature”, the people “expressly reserve the right to propose measures...and also the
right to require that any laws which the legislamre may have enacted shall be submitted
to a vote o f the electors of the state before going into effect” (Beard 1912).

The

amendment allowed both the initiative and the referendum to be invoked with just five
percent of the qualified electors o f the state, and also stipulated that the governor could
not exercise veto power over measures that were voted on by the people.
The following year, with support from the Knights o f Labor and the Farmers’
Alliance, the electors o f South Dakota adopted the process by a vote of 23,876 to 16,483
(Galbrcath 1912). Just a year later, the Oregon and Utah state legislamrcs followed suit
by submitting constitutional amendments allowing for both the initiative and referenda,
with Nevada, Missouri, and Montana all submitting and adopting by 1907.
Many similarities exist between the states that adopted the process between 1898 and
1912. During that time, only Missouri, Wyoming, and Mississippi^ failed to adopt the
measure, while twenty other states adopted the initiative, the referenda, or both. While
the passage rate in South Dakota was only 3-2 (23,816 for, 16,483 against), most other
states voted overwhelmingly in favor o f the direct democracy. For example, Oregon

' Missouri, Wyoming and Mississippi have all since adopted the initiative and referenda
process.
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voters affirmed the process by an 11-1 margin; Nebraska surpassed this with a 12-1
margin (Waters 2003).
The process, however, was not a rubber-stamp mechanism for all states. For
instance, while Illinois technically adopted the process in 1902, the vote was “advisory”
only; the legislature was not bound by the vote, and indeed, the legislature did not follow
through on the people’s mandate. Sixty-eight years later, a constitutional convention
passed a very limited form of the initiative, and it was approved by the voters by a scant
57%. Additionally, Delaware voters faced a similar situation, in which they were asked
by the legislature whether they wanted the initiative and referenda, and an overwhelming
“yes” vote (17,405 to 2,135) was never followed through on. This occurrence was not
limited to the early part o f the century; indeed, Rhode Island voters faced a similar
situation in 1996. In Michigan, the initiative and referenda were approved along with the
1908 Constitution, but signature requirements and cumbersome processes made the
process almost impossible to use (Beard 1912) and had to be re-approved with less
restrictive measures in 1913. In Nevada, the initial adoption included only the popular
referendum in 1905; it would be seven more years before the initiative would be
approved. Furthermore, Wyoming, Mississippi, and Minnesota voters were unable to
approve the process because the respective state constitutions required approval by all
those voting in the election - not just a majority by all those voting on the individual
amendment - and in these eases, “blank” votes counted as “no” votes. (Waters 2003).
Though Mississippi voters later ratified direet demoeraey (in 1914), Mississippi stands as
an outlier ease in that it became the only state to have the initiative process at one time
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only to lose it: in 1922, the state supreme court nullified the process on the basis o f a
technicality^ and was not properly reinstated until 1992 (Waters 2003).
After the initial wave of adoptions across the country (though primarily in the West),
few states adopted the process. Alaska adopted the process as part o f its original
constitution in 1959, though it was limited to statutes (not amendments) and did not
include the right to make appropriations. In 1968, Wyoming voters adopted the process
by a large margin (3-1) and Florida followed in 1972 by allowing only the constitutional
amendment initiative. Flowever, initiative usage in each o f these three states has been
very low: In Wyoming, only six initiatives were on the ballot between 1968 and 2000; in
Florida, 16 constitutional amendment initiatives appeared between 1972 and 2000, and in
Alaska, 31 initiatives appeared between 1960 and 2000 (Waters 2003). From 1904
through 2005, 2,153 statewide measures have been placed on ballots nationwide, and the
voters have adopted 877 o f these for a passage rate o f 41%. Sixty percent of these occur
in just six of the twenty-four states that have the initiative process: Arizona, California,
Colorado, North Dakota, Oregon and Washington (I and R Institute, Online).
The institution o f direct democracy today varies considerably across America
(Donovan and Bowler 1998; Tolbert, Lowenstein and Bowler, 1998; Lmst 2001). In
other words, the “gun behind the door” is a little bigger and more powerful in some states
than in others. The citizen initiative is available for use in 24 states. The first to adopt the
process was South Dakota in 1898; the most recent was Florida in 1972 (I and R Institute,

^ The Court held that because the initiative by statute and initiative by amendment were
both approved at the same time, the process was unconstitutional. The Court would have
preferred to see the processes adopted separately; though the legislature could have
approved two new amendments, it failed to act. (See Power v Robertson, 130 Miss. 188,
(%So.769).
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online). No state that has had the initiative process has ever retracted it (Ernst 2001). O f
the 24 states that have the initiative process, 18 allow their state’s constitution to be
amended via the process, and 21 allow for statutes to be initiated (thus, three states Florida, Illinois, and Mississippi only allow for the process to be used for constitutional
amendments). Further complicating - but central to - the analysis is the use o f direct and
indirect processes. 16 o f the 18 states allow the people to directly amend the state
constitution, while 2 states require the initiative to weave through the legislature first; o f
the 21 states that allow the statutes to be citizen-based, 14 allow for direct alteration, and
9 require^ the initiative to be addressed by the legislature first.
Similarly, requirements for placing an initiative on the ballot vary widely. In lowthreshold states, signature requirements can range from two percent (North Dakota) of
the total population to three percent (Massachusetts) o f the votes cast in the previous
election; high threshold states may require ten percent o f the votes cast in the prior
election with ten percent o f those from a majority o f the counties (Utah) to fifteen percent
o f the vote total from the previous election and gathered from at least two-thirds o f the
state’s counties (Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998).
State-level differences in the time frames required to gather signatures also varies.
For example, in 1996, 630,000 signatures needed to be collected in 150 days to have an
initiative placed on the ballot in California; while in Idaho, only 40,000 signatures were
needed in a year’s time (Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998). Indeed, the “initiative
industrial complex” has taken a firm hold in the process; professional signature gatherers
and professional consultants who coordinate messages and campaigns (Zisk 1987;

^ The extra two are due to the use o f both processes in Washington and Utah.
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McCuan, et al 1998; Magelby 1998; Donovan, Bowler and McCuan 2001); however, the
widespread belief that these individuals have co-opted the process in their own right is
unfounded (McCuan, et al 1998; Donovan, Bowler and McCuan 2001).
The fundamental differences o f direct legislation requirements in the direct
democracy states may be under-evaluated in the literature. Many studies that evaluate the
efficacy o f an initiative in terms o f its po wer to produce a policy in line with the desires
of the median voter, or in terms o f its ability to produce a responsible or responsive
policy, fail to recognize the core differences that exist in the ability to have an initiative
placed on the ballot in the first place. Following from the earlier discussion regarding
time frame and signature gathering requirements, the process o f direct and indirect
initiatives and amendments should also be considered.
For example, in Nevada, the state constitution mandates that both statutes and
constitutional amendments are available via the initiative process, but that statutes are an
indirect process, and amendments are direct (Bowers 2002). A secondary component to
this is that the legislature meets only biennially^. This means that if a group decides in
June 2007 to pursue a statutory initiative, they would need to gather 10% o f the registered
voters signatures in each o f Nevada’s 17 counties in a 10-month period^ submit it to the
2009 legislature, and if they decide not to vote on it, wait until the election of 2010 - a
^ Ironically, the Nevada Legislature is mandated to meet biennially due to a ballot
initiative passed by the people in 1960.
^ D u rin g th e 2 0 0 7 sessio n , the N e v a d a L e g isla tu re e n a c te d S B 5 4 9 , w h ic h in cre ased

signature requirements from 10% of the voters who voted in the previous election in 75%
o f the counties to 10% of the same population in each o f the 17 Nevada counties. This
change was facilitated by a U.S. District Court ruling {Committee to Regulate and
Control Marijuana v. Heller, No. CV-S-04-0135 (D. Nev., Aug 20, 2004)) that held the
previous formula to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as it “applied the same
formula to counties o f varying population” , and thus, the signatures from smaller, rural
counties carried more weight than the signature from larger counties.
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full 41 months after the initiative process begins. If the same group pursues an
amendment to the constitution, the state constitution requires that the measure be placed
on two successive ballots, and thus, while the measure could qualify for the 2008 general
election, if it was passed there, it would be required to stand for passage in 2010 as well.
In neither case would the measure have any chance of passing before three- and-a-half
years had passed. Conversely, in a state where the direct statute process is available, the
signatures for the initiative could be gathered in the fall (or theoretically, the spring
before the election and the measure could be placed on the ballot the very next fall - less
than 12 months).
It seems likely that this would affect the mindset o f groups attempting to decide
whether the best course would be an initiative or simply support for candidates who
would then in turn support their causes. This may have an effect on the outcomes
described by Donovan, et al, (1998) who outline a basic game theoretic model that pits
narrow-based groups versus broad-based groups, and also narrow-based groups vs.
narrow-based groups, and broad-based groups against broad-based groups. For example,
the authors characterize a narrow-based group as one who may have considerable
resources (money, access to legal advice, etc) but the benefits they seek are exclusive and
highly visible (e.g., trial lawyers or tobacco companies). Conversely, a broad-based group
may not be well organized, it may have few resources, and suffer from basic collective
action problems: the benefits they seek are often non-divisible (e.g., SieiTa Club,
consumer groups). Extensive analysis shows that, while moving “second” is generally
advantageous to either group (this group does not have the initial capital outlays), narrow
groups are best suited to defend the status quo rather than to attempt to alter it - often
contrary to the intuitive beliefs.
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What the authors imply but do not explicitly state is that the process o f direct
democracy as an institution favors those who move last - since they can oppose with less
money than those who had to move first. Following from this logic, it seems likely that
the more difficult the process (in terms o f signature gathering, time constraints, etc.) the
more money it would cost the supporter, and conversely, the less defensive capabilities
that supporter would have. Political and institutional structures shape the strategic context
in which political actors make choices (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Thus, institutional
rules and procedures would likely structure the process more than the desire for
generalizable data would allow.
In other words, while California is clearly a bell-weather state in many respects, its
professional legislature, direct constitutional amendment and statute process make it quite possibly - an unrepresentative sample o f the entire population o f direct democracy
states. The current authors make no claims about the generalizability of their data;
however, other authors do. It would be more accurate to say that the results are
generalizable to a state that has similar institutional structures in the process, rather than
to all o f the states. In an attempt to move to this end, an index of some sort should be
devised that assigns a “degree o f difficulty coefficient” to each state with the direct
democracy process. It should be additive in nature and consider the signature gathering
requirements, the professionalization of the legislature, how often it meets, and whether
the processes are direct or indirect. Banducci (1998) moves towards this but still does not
consider the differences in ballot qualifications among direct and indirect states. Such an
index will be discussed in later chapters.
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Salient Issues in the Institution o f Direct Democracy
As the Progressive-era reformers moved forward, several primary arguments began
to synthesize. Indeed, in the middle o f the boom years, scholar C.B. Galbreath (1912)
offered several thoughts regarding the process: that the process o f direct legislation would
eventually be introduced into almost all state constitutions; that direct legislation would
never fully replace the representative system (primarily because o f the increasing
population) and would be used to make “representative government more representative”
primarily by increasing legislative responsiveness (Galbreath 1912, 29); that the political
machines that have co-opted state legislatures will have their influence reduced, but that
the machines will begin to focus on manipulating the people directly; that citizenlawmaking should seek the advice o f professionals, especially in the drafting phase; and
that the process neither will be the ultimate answer to all governmental problems nor will
it be predestined to corruptive forces, as many thought (Galbreath 1912).
Oregon state legislator W.S. U ’Ren, an ardent supporter o f direct legislation
mechanisms and an instrumental figure in that state’s adoption process, evaluated the
initiative and referenda in Oregon after its first five years. Writing for the American
Political Science Association, U ’Ren (1907) argued that the process had successfully
abolished party bosses and political machines, made the debate over prohibition a local
matter, decreased legislative log-rolling and taxed corporations that had been dodging all by statutes alone. For U ’Ren, direct democracy was a tool available to the people to be
utilized for minor corrections to the governmental process; clearly, as a state legislator,
U ’Ren would not argue for the replacement o f representative government with direct
democracy.
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Guthrie (1912) provides further analysis o f the direct legislation process by arguing
that the rise o f parties often precluded individuals from expressing preferences among
individual policy choices, and that direct democracy helped to overcome this problem by
allowing people the opportunity to vote directly on issues without having to re-evaluate
their party loyalty or association. He further argues that the process allowed the people to
circumvent state legislatures that often did not consider (or could not consider) legislation
because o f special interest influence (or party bosses), and that the special interest
influence often resulted in laws that were injurious to the people in some fashion or
another. Moreover, Guthrie argues that because terms o f office had increased
considerably, the recall (excluding judges) was

a necessity; and that the signature

requirements put in place by all states would preclude government by “popular impulse”
(Guthrie 1912).
Ford (1912) argues along similar lines, but adds a further dimension: that the
apparent fervor motivating the introduction o f direct democracy was not a sudden
occurrence, but rather a continuation o f a “struggle that has been going on ever since this
country became an independent nation” - a struggle to bring the views o f the people into
harmony with the outputs o f government (Ford 1912, 66). In particular, Ford notes that
the framers of the American constitution were well aware o f the propensity for state-level
legislative shirking and corruption, and it was for this reason that a movement towards
national authority was prominent. Thus, Andrew Jackson’s recommendation that the
president appoint state governors, along with James Madison’s view that the national
government should have veto power over all acts produced by state governments, was
reduced influence only because small states would not have such an arrangement. For
Ford, the initiative and referenda process equalized apportionment by reducing the
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advantage that rural districts maintained (Ford notes that proportional representation was
uncommon, and that corruption was more common in “country areas”), as well as
reducing legislative barriers to constitutional amendments. Further, he argued that the
process of direct legislation overcame the stagnation that often results from the state
legislative committee system; that more “careful” and precise legislation would result
from direct democracy because o f the lack o f special interest influence; and also that the
recall should not extend to the judicial branch.
Protagonists make a strong argument in favor o f direct democracy. The notion that
an individual may submit their policy preferences for aggregation while remaining
independent o f party affiliations is clearly desirable. Moreover, having an opportunity to
circumvent state legislators (though the institution was often initiated by state legislators
themselves) is appealing to voters in that they are much more likely to have an
opportunity to weigh in on issues that state legislators would not have dealt with, whether
it be because special interest groups dominated the agenda, or because other influences
often bottled legislation up in the myriad o f committee systems. However, the process
was still, at least in some ways, antithetical to the foundations o f American governmental
structures. For many scholars (Peabody 1905; Haynes 1907; Sanborn 1908) the initiative
and referenda were quite clearly the wrong answer; for them, if the problem was within
the state legislators, then the people should simply work on electing more effective (and
presumably, honest) legislators. Moreover, there was little support for the notion that
simply placing initiatives and referenda on ballots would improve the efficaey o f the
citizenry on the process; after all, this was the point o f specialized, representative
legislatures: the idea that professionals would (and could) handle the complexities
involved in state-level lawmaking.
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The following sections outline some o f the more salient issues regarding direct
democracy in both the early days o f the process and today. The purpose o f this review is
twofold; first, to undertake a comprehensive review o f the extant literature regarding
direct democracy; and secondly to examine whether the issues today represent the
expectations o f the founders of the process. The consequences o f such an evaluation may
seem simplistic at first glance; however, the implications take on new meaning when
considering that the purpose o f this thesis is to examine the influence o f many o f these
issues on the process o f direct democracy. That is, it may be helpful to understand the
foundations o f the process in order to better evaluate the present-day efficacy o f the
institution o f direct democracy.
The Educative Effects of Direct Democracy
The notion that the institution o f direct democracy would serve as a cheek on the
state legislatures was not the only argument o f the Progressives. An important second
plank was the educative benefit: the idea that the process would enhance citizen
engagement, political knowledge, and also heighten citizens’ political (internal and
external) efficacy^ (Gerber 1996; Lascher, Hagen and Rochlin, 1996; Cambreco 1998;
Smith, M. 2001; Smith and Tolbert 2004). The argument stemmed from the belief that
because citizens were acting as lawmakers, they would become more engaged in, aware
of, and knowledgeable about the issues that they, as citizens, were now proposing and
acting upon. This argument was soon buttressed by Progressives after voter turnout levels

6

Internal efficacy refers to the notion that an individual may have an impact on the
political process; external efficacy refers to the institutional responsiveness towards
individuals.
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increased in the three successive elections after Oregon adopted the process in 1902
(Smith and Tolbert 2004).
Turnout levels in particular were of concern to early scholars as well. Peabody
(1905) evaluated early returns from South Dakota, Oregon, Missouri, and Massachusetts,
and while not considering overall turnout levels, argued that the significant drop-off from
top-ticket races to the initiatives and referenda in these states made it clear that “the
voters o f three of these states either are satisfied that their legislators are doing their work
properly...or do not care to take the frouble...to restrain legislative action” (Peabody
1905, 447). Further analysis on his part reveals that voters are much more likely to
participate fully when the question at hand is a municipal matter that has immediate
implications, while more general propositions are left largely unmarked. For Peabody, the
initiative and referenda were answers to the wrong problem. That is, for those seeking
political reform, attempting to supplant representative democracy (and ignoring the
prosperity that it helped bring to America) was an inefficacious route; rather, it is up to
the people to elect “wise and honest legislators” (Peabody 1905, 455). Sanborn (1908)
also found turnout to be low in the early days o f the process, noting that “in the long run,
only about one-half o f the voters who go to the polls will take the trouble to vote upon
laws submitted to them” (Sanborn 1908, 594).
Beard (1912) considered the relatively low levels o f voting on initiatives compared
to the top-ticket races in the early days o f the Oregon initiative and referenda process.
Noting that a criterion of a good law is the “adaptation to social and economic
environment,” and further that this is not easily aehieved if a measure is initiated by a
small group o f people and then put into effect by a minority o f voters. Beard argues that
detraetors should not expeet the same levels o f partieipation in constitutional and
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statutory questions as they would for top-ticket races because the nature o f the issues is
such that they may not appeal to the majority o f voters (e.g., a question regarding the
proper usage o f forest areas may be asked in a large urban metropolis simply because
both areas encompass the state; the question may be mundane or irrelevant to the
majority o f people); moreover, many states were (at the time o f his writing) considering
installing a threshold level (e.g., Washington stipulated that in order for an initiative to
become law, it must receive not only a plurality o f votes, but also that the total votes
equal at least one-third o f the total votes cast at the election). Moreover, Beard argues
that there is little reason to believe that many o f the measures passed by state legislatures
would, if submitted to a popular vote, gamer a plurality o f the vote - especially given the
workings o f committee systems, power-structures, and the extensive “logrolling” of
members (Beard 1912).
Modem research suggests that, at least in some cases, direct democracy does indeed
increase voter tumout, and while the normative nature o f “a new moral dimension”
invites further systematic evaluation, there is evidence that the “educative effects” of
direct democracy are both positive and real. Whether or not direct democracy has been
able to “revitalize the public sphere” (or whether the public sphere has revitalized direct
democracy) remains unclear.
In an early study, Everson (1981) found limited support for the notion that direct
democracy directly increased tumout levels. In an examination of states with the process
and those without it, Everson finds that tumout is higher in both presidential and off-year
elections in states with direct democracy compared to those that do not have the process.
However, when the Southem states are removed from the model, the advantage is
eliminated, and Everson argues that other factors (e.g., political culture; higher average
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tumout rates in the West) account for the differences between initiative and non-initiative
states. Thus, Everson concludes that while initiatives may have a positive impact on
tumout in special circumstances (such as the case o f an especially salient initiative), no
general long-term positive impact can be conclusively identified. These findings directly
echo earlier findings by Bone and Benedict (1976), who argued that while tumout levels
remained relatively constant, roll-off (the difference between those voting for top-ticket
races and those voting for initiatives or referenda) was most significant when the measure
dealt with complex issues, such as governmental stmcture, or taxation and revenue.
Tolbert, Gmmmel and Smith (2001) consider a similar question but find different
results. Using pooled time series data for all 50 states over a 26 year period, they find
support for the notion that direct democracy increases tumout. Like Everson, these
authors use the percentage of voting age population (VAP - as opposed to the percentage
o f registered voters, VEP) in measuring tumout levels, and they also control for the
South. They also add a variable that controls for difficulty in registering to vote, as well
as controls for individual level factors, such as income, education, and race.
Using OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors to allow for variation
across cross-sectional units, they find that tumout rates are not higher in presidential
election years in states with direct democracy. However, rates are higher in states that
have more initiatives on the ballot, even after controlling for state specific variations, and
this supports Everson in that salient issues (and multiple issues would increase the
chances o f saliency) increase tumout, although Everson had argued that this was the case
in midterms only. Their study o f midterm elections reveal that states with the initiative
process have higher tumout rates, but the number o f initiatives (and their level of
saliency) need not be as high to achieve the same result that was found in presidential
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elections. The authors contend that the low information nature o f midterm elections
results in a transformation to higher information elections when the initiatives are on the
ballot.
In a more recent study, Mark Smith (2001) finds that tumout levels in initiative
states are also affected by the type o f election. Smith finds that initiative salience is likely
to increase tumout levels by almost four percent during midterm elections, but provides
little catalyst for increased tumout in presidential years. Additionally, increased salience
is found by other scholars (Southwell and Passo 2001) to increase tumout levels when
other variables (e.g., candidate races, socioeconomic factors, southem states, and
partisanship) were controlled for; moreover, these authors argue that the “increased
costs^” assoeiated with initiatives has no effect on tumout. Although the model appears to
be well specified, the authors are attempting to explain individual level behavior using
aggregate level data^, which can prove problematic.'^ A later study incorporated the use of
surveys to overcome this ecologieal fallacy and better analyze individual data, and the
authors find that ballot propositions may “increase voter tumout by transforming lowinformation midterm elections into high-information elections”, thus mobilizing voters
(Smith and Tolbert 2004).

^ The authors extend Downs’ (1957) “expected party differential” theory to ballot
initiatives, arguing that ballot initiatives further “increase” the cost o f voting such that
voters may choose to abstain from voting due to the “prohibitive information costs” in
much the same way that Downs argued that voters would, at some point, reach a
threshold at w h ic h “d e te rm in in g p a rty d iffe re n tia l b e c o m e s e ss e n tia lly p ro h ib itiv e ”
(Southwell and Passo 2001, 276)
^ This limitation has been noted by the authors; however, it is neither explained nor
justified.
^ This problem is well documented throughout the literature; however, see Robinson
(1950) for a detailed overview.
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Tolbert and Smith (2005) also find increased turnout levels in states with frequent
initiative use. In this study, the authors use voting eligible population (VEP) rather than
the voting age population (VAP), which removes noncitizens and others ineligible to
vote. They find that each initiative appearing on the ballot increases VEP turnout by .3%.
The effects are stronger in midterm elections: each additional initiative on the ballot
raises voter turnout by 1.7% - enough, they argue, to swing a close election.

They

conclude that substantive measures on the ballot mobilize voters and can “reshape” the
electorate. The authors also note that differences in the operationalization o f “salience”
may account for the divergent findings regarding presidential elections in this study
compared to the prior one, wherein no effect was found on presidential elections. They
note that in the former study salience was measured by post-election media coverage,
while in the current study an index o f variables was constructed to measure pre-election
coverage.
In a work that eonsiders the notion o f ballot fatigue (sometimes referred to as roll-o ff
or drop-off; in either case, the term refers to the conception that voters may, for one
reason or another, vote less often as the number o f ballot measures increase on a given
ballot, or that less voting oecurs as the voter moves downward on the ballot, with the toplevel measures receiving more votes overall than the last measures listed), Bowler,
Donovan and Happ (1992) find that drop-off is most likely to oecur on the middle of the
ballot, rather than on the top or bottom, and furthermore that voters are actually quite
likely to mark the final ballot question - although they are likely to mark it “no.”
Moreover, the findings are proposition-specific, in that constitutional measures see more
drop-off than initiatives, and that increased campaign spending does have a positive
effect on reducing drop-off, as do elections in which turnout is increased. The authors
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make a fine argument that their findings are theoretically significant insofar as drop-off
indicates that the “information costs” outweigh the perceived benefit o f voting, and thus,
the consequence is that overuse o f the process can be problematic.
Absentee voting levels on direct legislation measures were also analyzed by Dubin
and Kalsow (1996). These authors contend that the “liberalization” o f absentee voting
laws could reshape the electorate and change the outcome o f elections. Their analysis
suggests that absentee voters have a higher drop-off rate on ballot measures than do
traditional voters, and in particular, they vote on fewer bond issues, state tax issues, and
property tax issues than do precinct voters. Conversely, absentee voters mark
affirmatively more often on issues dealing with education, welfare, and health care than
do precinct voters.
Thus, scholars have argued that the presence o f initiatives (as well as the
liberalization o f absentee voter laws) can reshape the electorate. Can reshaping the
electorate lead to campaign advantages for candidates? Examining the 2004 election,
Hillygus and Shields (2005) find no evidence o f salient ballot initiatives affecting the
vote choice, much to the contrary o f popular belief. In particular, the authors argue that
when partisan identification, evaluations o f the economy, and the war in Iraq were taken
into consideration, moral issues that had appeared on numerous ballots (e.g., gay rights;
abortion) had no impact on vote choice, and this outcome held constant among different
demographics. Thus, the question remains: just how salient does a salient ballot initiative
have to be to counter the traditional predictors o f vote choiee, sueh as partisan
identification and economic considerations? Other authors agree: Burden (2004) finds
support for his hypothesis regarding inereased support from white men and married
women - which he translates to concerns about domestic security, rather than for “moral
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issues” such as immigration and gay rights (certainly, white men and married women
wouldn’t care for either of these, right?), but also notes that an increase in turnout (but
does not rule out the presence o f salient initiatives as a factor) helped Bush in 2004. In a
further study, Abramowitz (2004) also agrees that ballot initiatives bad nothing to do with
the Bush victory in 2004, instead citing the “normal advantage o f ineumbeney and
preexisting divisions within the American electorate” rather than a fundamental change in
the ideology o f the electorate. Using the eligible voting population rather than simply the
voting-age population, Abramowitz’s OLS regression showed that the “presence o f gay
marriage referenda on the ballot had no impact on turnout,” when factoring in turnout in
the prior election, whether or not the voter lived in a swing state, and the presence of a
hotly-contested Senate race.
The ability of the GOP to use the initiative to its advantage is seemingly uncertain.
What is not proved here (or even considered) is whether or not the presence o f the moralbased ballot initiative hurt it. Clearly, it did not. Hasen (2000) argued that while
“conventional wisdom holds that the initiative process weakens the role of parties in
democratic polities,” both parties are beginning to use salient initiatives to “encourage
voter turnout and refine party stances on issues,” at least in California. Moreover, other
authors (Hadwiger 1992) conclude that considerable success for ballot measures is found
in low-tumout elections, sueh as special elections and local-only elections, and argues
that initiatives should not be placed on such ballots, because the outcome is not
representative o f the larger population. Hadwiger also finds strong support for increased
spending resulting in increased turnout for a ballot initiative, but finds the largest
coefficient (predictor of turnout) is the type o f measure voted on. In another study
regarding county-wide elections, Dubin and Kalsow (1996) find that absentee voters are
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much more likely to vote “yes” on questions related to education, health and welfare,
than precinet voters, although in general, absentee voters cast fewer votes on initiatives
than do those voting in person.
Moving away from group-level voting behavior, Branton (2003) considers individual
level voting behavior on state ballot propositions and argues that there are consistent
patterns in voting behavior on ballot initiatives. In particular, Branton found that
individual level partisan identification was a key predictor o f vote choiee on statewide
ballot measures, and further analysis found that ballot measure vote choice was
ideologically parallel to their respective partisan identifications.
Thus, support for the notion that direct democracy increases turnout appears to be
limited to midterm elections, rather than being independent o f the type of election;
however, none of the scholars found evidence that the institution o f direct democracy
lowered turnout rates.
The so-called ‘educative effects” o f direct democracy extend beyond turnout. As
noted earlier, Progressive-era supporters speculated that the process would increase
political knowledge on the part o f the voter. Early authors present mixed views on the
“educative” effects on the initiative. Beard (1912) argues that the Oregonian system of a
state-sponsored program to send arguments in favor of and in opposition to all measures
placed on a ballot (prepared and paid for by supporters o f the individual measures) could
have an “immense educational value in arousing the interest o f the people, in securing
consideration o f each measure on its merits, and in turning the search-light o f publicity
and discussion upon all the important political issues in the state” (Beard 1912, 42)
though other scholars point out that an intelligent voter does not necessarily lead to
intelligent voting, nor does it lead to uninfluenced voting: problematic people in the
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legislatures are not going to be altered by instituting direct democracy alone, and more
simply, having low turnout - and turnout comprised o f voters who have not had the
benefit of deliberation that state legislators have - is problematic when voting on policies
directly (Sanborn 1908).
The education process itself presents a fundamental question: who should be doing
the educating? Haynes (1907) considers the question o f the responsibility o f the state in
educating its voters about ballot measures, and finds tbat tbe Oregonian system of
distributing ballot measure information to each voter prior to election day is in the best
interest o f the state: the state cannot depend on voters who are only able to read mediaprovided explanation of issues. Moreover, because the citizens are now legislators, they
should be provided with the same type o f information available to legislators with the
expectation that informed voters may be better able to deliberate among themselves prior
to election day - in much the same way that legislators do.
The question o f the educative effects o f direct democracy is no less prominent for
scholars o f today. For example, Mark Smith (2002) finds that those who vote on ballot
measures gain in “civic abilities,” (e.g., political knowledge) while at the same time, non
voters in the same state see no sueh increases. The author argues that there are two
important consequences o f this finding. First, insofar as increased political knowledge
was a goal o f the original advocates o f direct democracy, the process has proven
successful. Secondly, following the tenets o f participatory democratic theory (especially
as outlined by Rousseau and John Stuart Mill), participation precedes political awareness
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and increases in both political knowledge and c a p a c i t y f o r political knowledge, and
thus, (at least for this author) the process o f voting on ballot initiatives may lead to
increased political awareness. Although the author does control for factors that affect
political knowledge (e.g., the ability, motivation, and opportunity of an individual to
acquire such knowledge) the author does not account for the endogeneity that may be
present: the results may not be as much participation leading to increased political
knowledge as increased political knowledge lead to participation. In short, this author
claims causation when only correlation is proven. ' * In a later work, the authors consider
the social capital data put forth by Putnam (1995) and argue tbat states witb frequent
ballot initiatives have higher levels o f social capital even after controlling for economic,
social and political variations across the states (Smith and Tolbert 2004, 71); ftirtber, tbey
argue in a separate work (Tolbert and Smith 2006, 25) that the educative effects o f the
process on “civic engagement, political participation, interest groups and political parties
may prove to be equally, or more, important than any policy resulting from its
instrumental use.”
Zisk (1987) questions the efficacy o f direct democracy to increase political
knowledge on the part of the voter, noting that turnout levels have not increased
significantly, that a large number o f polls report “undecided” on controversial issues, and
also tbat drop-off figures for initiatives and referenda compared to candidates on
The term “capacity” as used by Smitb (2002) is apparently meant to mean “ability” in
the sense that “capacity” could be considered to be th at w h ich h u m a n s are born w ith.
Thus, participation would not be able to increase “capacity” as considered here, though it
could increase an individual’s ability to increase political knowledge.
'' The author is clear that causation has been proven: “Tbis finding indicates that it is
voting on initiatives, rather than merely living in a state that allows them, that creates the
increases in political knowledge” (Smith 2002, 900).
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statewide ballots signify little evidence of increased knowledge or motivation on the part
of the voter that can be attributed to direct democracy. Moreover, she notes that wellfinanced media campaigns are quite successful in defeating initiatives sponsored by adhoc groups, and that in particular, the extraordinarily superficial advertisements (e.g.,
“Prop D is Dumb”) that have proven effective do not capture the goal of increased
educative capacity that the Progressives had hoped for (Zisk 1987, 251).
While the authors presented here make the case for an educative benefit o f direct
democracy, the conclusions should be questioned. It would be an error in logic to assume
(or argue, as some authors have done here) that the mere presence o f an initiative would
better educate an individual citizen, make an individual citizen more likely to participate,
or increase tbe internal or external efficacy o f tbat citizen. Quite simply, an individual
citizen must still put forth the effort to educate himself, and while salient issues may be
much more likely to motivate participation, such participation does not automatically
equate to guaranteed long-term participation. Increased turnout in a single election due to
a highly salient initiative does not constitute increased participation, knowledge or
efficacy. However, what the process may do is provide an increase in the possibility that
voters could become more politically active. To argue any more than that would be to
overreach.
Interest Group Influence in Direct Democracy
Along with the unresponsive nature o f state legislatures, interest groups may have
provided the greatest motivation in the Progressives’ push for governmental reform in the
form o f direct democracy. Indeed, the notion o f the citizenry at the forefront of American
politics was, as has been shown here, at the heart o f the Populist and Progressive
arguments. However, the early arguments that direct democracy was immediately
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successful in disarming special interests (U ’Ren 1907; Ford 1912; Guthrie 1912; Smith,
M 2002) may have been premature.
Magelby (1984) argues that among the first groups to take advantage o f the initiative
may have been large special interests themselves. He provides the example o f a
“competing railroad” unable to break into a geographic territory because o f the
monopolistic corporate nature o f the time that could claim machine politics and seek the
vote o f the people. Magelby further argues that the Progressives themselves may not have
been as “diverse” as they have been made out to be; conversely, many were middle class,
urban, and well-educated, self-employed businessmen. Thus, the motivation may not
have necessarily been a better government, but rather, a chance to change the rules that
prevented the status quo from being changed.
Conceptualized in this way, yet another paradox in direct democracy emerges: the
notion that the process has been co-opted by the very organizations (e.g., insurance
conglomerates, trial lawyer associations, large tobacco companies) that it was meant to
defend against cannot be true, mainly because the process was never the vox populi that it
was made out to be, and thus, could not be co-opted in the first place. The assumption
that many scholars have made (Gerber 1998; Smith and Lubinski 2002) is direct
democracy was once an institution that was, in some way or another, “off limits” to large
organizations, and available only to those groups who intended to improve democracy in
America..

The early days o f the institution were easily imagined: economic interests

were not allowed to participate; powerful groups feared the inevitability o f defeat via the
initiative; and the people had succeeded in taking back their government. Moreover, these
scholars further asserted that “somewhere” along the way, the once-defeated, well-heeled
special interests groups were able to take over the mechanism used so often against them,
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and transform it into a tool through which programs received the stamp o f approval from
the masses and became public law.
Smith and Lubinski (2002) consider this point and provide ease-study evidence that
directly refutes the notion the initiative and referendum were originally used to “cheek
the corporate dominance of state legislatures” (Smith and Lubinski 2002, 351). They
find that while eitizen-based initiatives intended to combat special interests were among
the thirty-two propositions on the 1912 general election ballot, special interests
themselves (mainly mining interests and public utilities) were also heavily involved in the
process. Interestingly, these special interests did not utilize overt tactics to seek support;
instead, they attempted to cloak their sponsorship - indeed, they sought to misdirect
sponsorship o f initiatives towards less threatening groups, and also utilized counter
initiatives. Thus, the authors argue that “the case demonstrates how special interests
during the Progressive Era were able to subvert the initiative process by intentionally
placing a measure on the ballot to confuse voters...or have citizens unwittingly pass
legislation...” (Smith and Lubinski 2002, 364).
Oregon was not alone in experiencing this phenomenon. In a work that focuses on
California two decades later, Goebel (2002) makes several notable points regarding the
formation of direct democracy as an institution. First, he argues that economics, and not
politics, was the main driving force behind the reform community’s push for the
initiative, referendum, and recall - and that in particular, they were conceptualized as a
method to abolish “oppressive monopolies and artificial trusts in America by removing
the legislative basis for their existence” (Goebel 2002, 11). This notion of antimonopoly
sentiment has deep roots in American culture, and it was the Populist movement o f the
1890s that widely highlighted these

sentiments.
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Goebel

argues that “populist

republicanism” (a framework that reeoneeptualized the Marxist and liberalism notions of
economics determining politics into one based on longstanding American antimonopoly
sentiments that saw politics as determining economies) was based on “intellectual and
political tradition that stretched back to the early decades o f the nineteenth century”
(Goebel 2002, 12).
Secondly,

Goebel

argues that Progressive

ambition notwithstanding,

direct

democracy in the early part o f tbe twentieth century quickly became a tool of special
interests - and not one o f Progressive reformers. This was mainly due to the rising
campaign costs (e.g., the costs o f gathering signatures for petitions and media relations)
and the rapid rise o f an industry o f professional signature gatherers. In some states, such
as California, there were no geographic restrictions on the gathering o f signatures (i.e.,
signatures required in a certain percentage o f counties in a state) and thus, signatures
could be gleaned from dense urban areas. The process favored those who were already
powerful; groups that had been targeted only a short time before had essentially been
given yet another weapon: “ .. .it was highly ironic that [these] same groups were the ones
that acquired even further politieal leverage with the help o f the initiative and
referendum” (Goebel 2002, 154).
Third, Goebel argues that the process o f direct democracy was able to become a
stronger institution in the American W est because “weak parties coexisted with powerful
interest groups” which allowed a political culture to develop that included direct
democracy (Goebel 2002, 136). Conversely, tbe parties were better able to control the
political landscape in other areas o f the country, and were better able to deter the
proliferation o f the movement by using legal maneuverings, never adopting the process in
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the first place, or simply reacquiring the dominance that was temporarily lost in the
Progressive and Populist heydays.
Recent scholars consider interest groups and direct democracy with a slightly
different focus. Boehmke (2005) considers the indirect effects of direct legislation by
examining how institutions shape interest group systems. In particular, his research
question asks how the ability o f organized interest groups to circumvent the legislative
process alters traditional state and interest group politics, and argues that access to the
direct legislation process produces important differences in the interest group populations
in initiative and noninitiative states, in terms o f both quantity and strategy. Boehmke
argues that states that have the initiative process have 30% more interest groups and 40%
more citizen groups, which in turn makes them more representative. Furthermore, interest
group strategy is affected by the type o f group and its available resources: Boebmke
argues that groups in initiative states have more members and fewer financial resources,
which forces them to emphasize “outsider” strategies, such as organizing protests, rather
than “insider strategies,” which may include directly contacting legislators or testifying
before committees. Finally, Boehmke finds that initiative states will adopt policies
quicker than non-initiative states, and that policy adoptions by initiative states will be
informative to non-initiative states considering similar policies. Thus, the indirect effects
of direct legislation affect policy adoption, policy diffusion, interest group mobilization,
interest group characteristics, and interest group lobbying behavior.
Insofar as direct democracy was initially installed as a method to increase
responsiveness and responsibility among state governments, primarily by neutralizing
powerful special interest influence over the legislatures, the question o f the success of
this method is largely unresolved. Gerber (1999) frames the question as the “Populist
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Paradox” - the notion that “direet legislation has paradoxically become a powerful
instrument o f wealthy interest groups rather than a popular balance between [eitizen and
eeonomie] groups” (5).
Gerber begins her systematie study by offering a typology o f direet legislation
options available to interest groups; the direct modification o f the status quo (at the ballot
box); the indireet modifieation o f the status quo (pressuring other aetors, sueh as state
legislators); direet preservation o f the status quo; and indireet preservation o f the status
quo. A further typology separates “eeonomie” interest groups (groups with large finaneial
resources, sueh as a trial lawyers, ete) from “personnel” interest groups (groups with few
financial resources but widespread membership). Gerber further categorizes several
“hurdles” that must be overcome to plaee a proposition on the ballot: drafting the
measure, qualifying the measure, running a suceessful campaign, ete., but also notes that
opposing strategies are available as well: proposing counter (killer) initiatives, forming a
campaign against an initiative, ete. Thus, to the extent that interest groups must overcome
any one (or any number) of these hurdles, the ability to overcome these hurdles depends
strongly on the type o f resources the group has (whether economic or personnel) and the
option pursued by the group (e.g., direct or indirect modification or preservation o f the
status quo). In other words, groups have “comparative advantages” depending on
membership composition (Gerber 1999: 76) and thus, the strategies they choose are
largely dependent upon the resources produced by the membership composition.
Gerber makes three main conclusions from several tested hypotheses. First, she
concludes that economic interests use direct legislation to pass laws, but they are more
often used to preserve the status quo, or to pressure the legislature (thus, direct
preservation o f the status quo; indirect modification/preservation o f the status quo), while
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citizen groups will often use direct legislation to pass new laws (direct modification of
the status quo). Consequently, the notion that economic groups dominate the direct
legislation process is not supported.
Seeondly, Gerber argues that there is a statistically significant difference in state
policies between states with and without direet legislation. In particular, policies in
initiative states “more closely reflect estimated state median voters’ preferences” (Gerber
1999: 135). Further, this effeet is greatest where access to direct legislation is easiest in
terms o f qualifications. Gerber concludes that this is a function o f direet democracy, in
that the threat o f an initiative (put forth by either type o f group) is enough to make the
legislature pass laws closer to the median voter’s preferences when sueh a measure is
available.
Finally, Gerber argues that sinee interest group behavior translates to policy
outcomes, laws that pass via the initiative as a result o f citizen-based groups should better
reflect opinions o f broad groups, while laws that fail via the initiative process should
reflect the interests o f economic groups. Gerber finds support for both arguments, and
concludes that “although the populist paradox takes a form different from the one alleged
by modem critics o f direct democracy, it is nevertheless, a paradox” (Gerber 1999: 144).
The paradox, of course, is not that powerful economic groups can pass whatever laws
they wish, but that they have significant success in influencing policy by maintaining the
status quo and indirectly influencing state legislators.
Other authors are not so quick to agree. Alexander (2002) utilizes a dual case study
approach to contradict Gerber’s’ quantitative study o f interest groups activities and
campaign finance data from 161 different initiative and referendum campaigns in eight
states. Alexander considers two gaming initiatives, California’s tribal gaming proposition
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and the Missouri riverboat gaming proposition in an attempt to answer three main
questions regarding interest group participation in the process o f direct democracy. First,
he considers the question of “which groups” are involved in the process, and finds that in
these cases, gambling-based interest groups supported the measures in the states, while
Nevada-based gaming groups opposed; furthermore, in the Missouri case, religious
groups formed in opposition to the measure and formed (strangely) alliances with Nevada
gaming groups. Thus, gaming interests were largely in favor, while citizens groups were
largely in opposition.
Secondly, he ponders the nature o f the activities that the groups are engaged in, and
finds that both groups adopted an “us versus them” approach, and the traditional roles
held (insofar as economic groups raised money while citizen groups raised personnel
resources). Finally, Alexander contradicts Gerber’s earlier finding by arguing that the
economic groups were able to raise both money and personnel resources, and implies that
while the primary indicator o f success or failure includes the levels o f resources (whether
monetary or personnel), citizen groups actually do not have an advantage when trying to
directly modify the status quo, and economic groups do have an advantage when
attempting to directly maintain the status quo.
Gerber’s examination o f the “populist paradox” is a well-rounded, methodical study
o f an important question. Gerber illustrates her thesis simply, and selects relevant
independent variables to specify her model. In particular, her categorization o f the
different types o f interest groups, as well as the different types o f influence they may
attempt to achieve, allows the conclusions to build flawlessly on the premises. Her
conclusion supports earlier studies by Donovan, et al (1998) that found economic groups
more successful at preserving the status quo as opposed to changing it, and adds the
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element o f indirect influence on the state legislators or other policymakers. Insofar as her
work rests upon the assumption that the median voter’s preferences are actually
responsible preferences, the research could be expanded to consider the long-term effects
o f policy outcomes via direct democracy. Matching interest groups’ preferences to state
policy and to the median voter does not necessarily indicate responsible policy, althougb
it does indicate responsive policy.
Alexander’s refutation o f Gerber appears problematic. Alexander begins his book
by noting that two case studies will hardly produce generalizable results. Instead, his goal
is to uncover the complexities o f the process in an effort to better understand the
dynamics at work in the interest group-direct democracy relationships. However, he
concludes his book by clearly refuting Gerber’s conclusion that economic groups were
able to raise both personnel and money (going so far as to quote her by name, actually).
Given the difficulty in generalizations, it seems that a refutation o f an earlier
(quantitative, longitudinal) study is not within the acceptable range o f options, especially
from a case study (cross-sectional) approach. Putting aside for a moment the fact that
both of Alexander’s case studies involved the same subject (gaming), there is no
indication that the groups outlined in Alexander’s work were actually eeonomie groups,
insofar as described by Gerber. In other words, while “eeonomie” based interest groups
in Alexander’s work were able to mobilize persormel resources in addition to monetary
resources, Alexander could have done a better job examining (and showing) the
similarities between “his” economic groups and the economic groups outlined in
Gerber’s work. It is not likely that the “eeonomie” groups outlined in Alexander are the
same trial lawyers or insurance groups that populated Gerber’s works. The eeonomie
groups outlined in Alexander’s seem to be broad based citizens groups that had a little
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more money than the next group. Moreover, Alexander noted that coalitions composed o f
“strange bedfellows” were in support o f this measure. How were these coalitions
classified? While it is clearly possible that Gerber’s thesis could be refuted (and is likely
wrong, in my opinion - eeonomie interests eould likely mobilize personnel if they needed
to - they just didn’t need to) it is not possible to refute it from the evidence presented
here.
Thus, the Progressive notion that direct democracy would essentially break the back
o f special interests groups does not appear to have been fulfilled. There are likely several
explanations for tbis. First, because interest groups are designed to fulfill tbeir own
purposes, and bave developed specialized procedures for accomplishing such tasks (e.g.,
offering selective incentives to overcome collective action problems), the very presence
of tbe initiative and referenda does not deter tbe group from maintaining access to its
preferred group: the state legislature. Indeed, because direet democracy is not restrictive
in any way (and any prohibitive restrictions, such as signature requirements, would be
best overcome by groups) tbere was no reason wby an interest group would not
immediately seek access to this new vehicle o f policy aggregation. Clearly, not all
Populist and Progressive measures were popular (especially the Populist attempts to
increase inflation) and special interests would have quickly realized that they could take
advantage of a process geared towards groups with resources (better able to overcome tbe
requirements), a media that had little formal rules, and what was likely an unsophisticated
electorate. Indeed, tbe Farmer’s Alliance, wbich was instrumental in tbe formulation of
Populism, and later direct democracy (Barens 2004), was itself an interest group. That
campaigns, whether for candidates or initiative, are often intentionally elusive (especially
as far as sponsors go) is seemingly axiomatic and timeless.
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The influence o f special interests on the institution o f direct democracy does seem to
be well-determined. Scholars agree that narrow-material interests (such as trial lawyers or
tobacco companies) are much more likely to be successful in defeating initiatives and
maintaining the status quo than in passing initiatives. Conversely, broad based groups
that may make up in resources (e.g., personnel) what they lack in funds have found
success in getting a wide variety o f measures passed via the initiative. Thus, the
Progressive dream may have been realized, but only insofar as broad-based groups
appear to be more successful at getting initiatives passed than groups that are traditionally
considered “well-heeled special interests.”
Direct Democracy, Public Opinion, and Policy Outcomes
Proceeding with the assumption that interest group desires may not always correlate
with citizen preferences, a cursory look at direct democracy and public opinion, as well
as policy outcomes, may be helpful. This section does not consider the original
arguments o f the Progressives, but deals with salient issues in the institution o f direct
democracy today.
Bowler and Donovan (1994) consider information and opinion change models, and
find that the lack o f “cues” available to voters on ballot initiatives results in traditional
opinion change models not holding when applied to direct democracy. In particular, they
argue that the initial stages o f the campaign are characterized by low levels o f voter
awareness, and this leaves little room for a later conversion. However, as the campaign
continues and voters become more aware o f a given proposition, stability appears to be
the norm, and no serious link is found between campaign exposure and individual level
opinions. They also find that “awareness” is required for opinion formation, and that the
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higher educated will utilize more sources o f information (such as public voter guides),
which will result in higher levels o f awareness.
Nicholson (2003), on a slightly different track, considers the factors that contribute
to ballot proposition awareness. Nicbolson finds that “environmental” factors, such as the
electoral cycle, media coverage, campaign spending, issue characteristics, and the
number of days before an election, all contribute to ballot proposition awareness. Using
California polling numbers as the dependent variable, Nicholson finds that between 19562000, midterm elections, initiatives that dealt with moral or civil rights questions, media
eoverage, and campaign spending all increased ballot initiative awareness, wbile
increased numbers of initiatives on a particular ballot, and the number o f days to an
election had a decreased effect on ballot initiative awareness. Most importantly perhaps,
is Nicholson’s finding that increased negative spending increased ballot initiative
awareness considerably, while positive spending (in favor of) resulted in a small, nonstatistically significant coefficient.
In finding that direct democracy states are not a predictor o f increased policy
responsiveness, Laseher, Hagen and Rochlin (1996) specified a very creative model. The
authors seemed to do well to utilize aggregated surveys of public opinion as the
dependent variable to measure tbe desires o f citizens. Moreover, these authors also
eonsidered the frequency of initiative use and the type o f initiative most often used in an
effort to gauge the overall ability o f the initiative process to correspond with public
opinion. They also chose to operationalize their variables along a liberal-conservative
continuum, selecting policies such as education spending, health and welfare spending,
enaetment of various consumer protection laws, legalized gambling measures, and tax
progressivity. The idea was to develop an index of “electorate ideology” and then
60

compare that index to an index o f “policy ideology.” Scatterplot analysis should show a
stronger relationship between these two in initiative states versus noninitiative states, and
it did not. A second model used policy outcome as tbe dependent variable and included
socioeconomic variables as controls to test whether the presence o f the initiatives would
enhance the extent to which a relatively “conservative state electorate obtained
conservative policies” and vice-versa. Again, the results were negative.

Contradicting

earlier arguments that direct democracy acts as an” increased veto power” used by the
citizens to ensure responsiveness

(the notion being that a purely representative

democracy leads to principal-agent problems, and legislator shirking), these authors find
four essential explanations as to wby direct democracy fails to enhance responsiveness.
First, although the threat o f an initiative may force legislators to consider the topic
(Gerber 1996; 1998), legislators may also serve as an “appeals court that ameliorates the
effects o f ballot measures for large groups.” Secondly, the authors argue that initiatives
themselves are “imperfect reflections of the public’s desires” insofar as voters are “not
necessarily representative o f the electorate as a whole” (e.g., higher socioeconomic
status). Thus, initiatives that may favor lower socioeconomic groups are less likely to
pass given the electorate composition. Third, “organized interest groups dominate the use
of the interest group process,” mainly due to the organizational hurdles required to
successfully place a measure on the ballot. Finally, the authors argue that the underlying
premise (that legislators are unresponsive in the first place) may be flawed, and that
“state legislatures and other policymakers take public opinion into account when enacting
state policy” (773).
Turning attention to policy outcomes resulting from direct democracy finds no less
of a debate. Gamble (1997) argues tbat “without tbe filtering mechanisms o f the
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representative system, direct democracy promotes majority tyranny.” In so doing,
Gamble evaluates three decades o f initiatives and legislative referenda from five civil
rights policy areas (housing, school desegregation, gay rights and AIDS policies) and
finds that initiatives that restrict civil rights are prone to extraordinary electoral success;
75% passage, while during the same period, only 33% o f other initiatives passed.
Matsusaka (1995) considers fiscal policies and direct democracy, and finds that
spending is, on average, 4% lower in states with direct democracy; that local spending is
higher and state spending is lower; and that on the revenue side, states with direct
democracy rely less on broad based taxes and more on charges tied to services. He
concludes that, taken together, this means that “the initiative leads to a reduction in the
overall size o f the government sector and suggests that it causes a decline in the level o f
redistributional activity.” Focusing on the economic theory o f government (change
occurs via conflict but within the constraints o f institutional rules), Matsusaka argues that
the lack o f “log-rolling” mechanisms (or gains-from-trade hypotheses) may result in
outcomes that are closer to the median voter preferences, and that, in particular, fiscal
outcomes in direct democracy states should be closer to median voter preferences than
those in noninitiative states.
Extending works reviewed here (Matsusaka 1995; Laseher, Hagen and Rochlin
1996), Camobreco (1998) also takes on the responsiveness question, and in particular,
with regard to fiscal policies. Using state and local tax revenues per capita, state and local
tax “efforts” (the extent to which states use their available tax base) and state and local
expenditures per capita as dependent variables, Camobreco finds no evidence that
“presence o f the initiative process strengthens the link between preferences and fiscal
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policies.” The author also finds evidence that Matsusaka’s (1995) notion that initiative
states shift their sources o f revenue and spending may be correct.
Fiscal policies may create unintended consequences, and tbis may be the case if they
are installed via the initiative, or by state legislators. Bowler and Donovan (2004) find
tbat state tax and spending limitations (TEL’s) bave spurred tbe creation o f local
governmental districts in response to constraints placed on budgeting. Tbese “special
districts” are created by state legislatures and generally mandated to fulfill a specific
service (e.g., library districts, bealtb districts, parks and recreation districts) and have the
“power to tax, to charge fees, issue debt, appropriate land for public use.” Thus, states
may create special districts in order to continue to provide goods and services despite
constraints mandated by TEL’s.
If tax and spending limitations do in fact limit spending, it seems intuitive to tbink
that schools may suffer as well. Gerber, et al (2001) consider tbis question during a study
of tbe effects o f California’s Proposition 13 and Proposition 4 in 1978. Proposition 13
was intended to drastically reduce property taxes (and cap future levels) wbile
Proposition 4 would limit spending to either the rate o f inflation or the percentage
increase in personal income. As Gerber notes, many bave blamed tbe deteriorating
condition in tbe California schools on the passing of Proposition 13. However, Gerber
argues tbat tbis blame is quite meritless.
Gerber wisely considers the context o f per pupil spending in broad fashion. She finds
that an earlier California Supreme Court decision {Serrano v. Priest) outlawed the
practice of funding schools at the district levels, and instead mandated that all districts
would be required to receive tbe same levels o f state-granted funding. The idea was to
equalize the districts, since the old way resulted in wealthier districts providing higher
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levels o f funding for their schools. Gerber also notes that the older method resulted in
motivations and willingness to pay higher property taxes at the local level; as the
equalization method was implemented, the motivation evaporated.'^
In effect, the Court decision did equalize districts; however, the consequences were
once again unintended: net funding in the districts decreased. Over time, however, Gerber
finds that the Court’s decision, as well as Propositions 4 and 13, had little effect on the
rate o f per pupil spending in California. The impact was apparent, but it was indirect.
Gerber finds that the observed declines are “the consequence o f a state that had grown
significantly less affluent relative to other states in the country and that persists in
allocating a smaller share o f its budgetary resources to public schools.” By observing
this to be the case before and after the propositions were passed, Gerber shows that the
gap in California funding relative to other states is not the direct consequence o f lower
property taxes, and by extension, not the consequence o f direct democracy.
In sum, Bowler and Donovan’s (1994) work on information and opinion change may
have been improved slightly by the use o f categories for ballot initiatives. In other words,
voter awareness is likely to be significantly different for an “English only” law from what
it would be for a sales tax exemption for farm vehicles. However, the overall additions to
the literature are well-received, as are Nicholson’s contribution regarding environmental
factors. In particular, Nicholson’s (2003) finding that negative spending increases ballot
proposition awareness supported earlier studies by Donovan, et al (1998) and Gerber
(1999). Gamble’s (1997) argument that direct democracy promotes majority tyranny

It should be noted that the premise o f Gerber’s work is to show that differences exist in
how initiatives are implemented. In the current case, the initiative was implemented
quickly and efficiently; in other cases, governmental actors simply ignored the initiative,
wrote unfriendly legislation, or in other ways attempted to alter the effect.
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seems to focus too much on smaller municipalities. Donovan and Bowler (1998)
(following M adison’s logic in Federalist 10) find that the tyranny that more easily occurs
on a municipal level does not occur when similar measures are voted upon at a state
level. Moreover, they argue that the courts routinely act as a protector in cases such as
these.
Although Laseher, et al (1996) argue that their data contradict Matsusaka (1995) in
terms o f the ability o f the initiative to produce state level policies more in line with the
median voter’s preferences, it is likely that the divergence is a matter o f the policies
studied. For Matsusaka, the policies under examination were tax and spend policies, and
most voters, whether it is in their long term interest or not, would like less taxes, and
(oddly enough) less spending, though most voters are aware o f the link between the two.
Insofar as Matsusaka finds lower spending in states with direct legislation (likely a
function of initiative -based tax and spend limitations, although not mentioned in this
article) this is much more likely to align with median voter preferences. Laseher, et al.,
examine a wide range of policy areas, and find that the electorate ideology rarely
coincides with the ideology o f the policy outcomes. This could be a function of many
things, including the type o f initiative under examination, the difficulty in getting an
initiative on the ballot in a given state, the political culture o f the nation at the time o f the
election, or the economic conditions in the state at the time o f voting. Moreover, “state
ideology” is problematic as well. Defining state ideology in Nevada is tough, and the
north-south split is likely less pronounced in Nevada than it is in California. Thus,
determining policy responsiveness in states with and without the initiative may be too
difficult a process to measure, and especially so when considered across time.
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Minority Rights and Direct Democracy
The issue o f minority rights may be a more recent issue in direct democracy, likely
due to the increasing heterogeneity o f the population o f the course o f the century. Though
the process was seen as an impetus in the women’s suffrage movement (Ford 1912;
Guthrie 1912), the Progressives viewed themselves as the minority and proceeded as
such. Thus, subsequent initiatives and referenda dealing with minorities in America are a
wholly new issue, and some o f the more salient components o f the issue are considered
here.
Although not specifically referring to minorities, Matsusaka (1992) argues that state
legislators act as a sort o f “filter” for issues, taking the easy ones (termed Pareto comparable, because the outcomes are such that the “majority-favorable” outcome is easy
to detemiine) and leaving the “distributional” issues (divisive issues that take power or
resources from one group and give to another, such as English-only initiatives) for the
voters to decide via the initiative. Thus, for Matsusaka, a well-functioning system is one
that has multiple distributional issues on the ballot via the initiative process, and this
outcome is favorable because voters are likely to have more information on the
controversial, divisive issues than they would on non-controversial, efficient issues.
If Matsusaka attempts to explain why hot-button social issues are more likely to be
decided via the direct democracy process, Tolbert and Hero (2001) further the debate
with an explanation o f how minorities fare in the process. They analyze support for
initiatives that target minorities and find that support for such initiatives was largely a
function o f the context of the residential area in which the voters lived. Specifically,
support for such initiatives was higher in counties with bifurcated minorities and in
counties with very low racial diversity (homogeneous). White support for measures that
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restrict minority rights is lowest in heterogeneous racial and ethnic counties. The same
authors argued in an earlier study that there has been in a sense a “new populism” in
California: using the initiatives against minorities by mainly white elites because the
legislature had, in their minds, become overly representative of tbe minorities. In a sense,
tbe increased Latino and black influence in tbe state resulted in a voter backlash against
the gains of all minorities in the state legislature.
In an earlier study, Wenzel, Donovan and Bowler (1998) argue that the tolerance
required to vote against an initiative requires “a commitment o f substantial cognitive
resources.” In traditional elections, “elites” lead tbe way in fostering tolerance, as well as
“tolerant” position'^ through the natural (and generally requisite) deliberative process.
The problem, as tbese authors see it, is that in an initiative campaign, no such elites exist,
and thus, the possibility for exploitation becomes more real, since no deliberation among
the elites takes place. If the assumptions that campaigns can change attitudes are
accurate, then the debate that arises over soeial issues may be sueeessful in setting the
agenda (Nicholson 2003). Tbe present authors find mixed results, but conclude that direct
democracy “may operate to the detriment o f the toleration o f political out-groups.”
Donovan and Bowler (1998) also consider whether direct democracy produces
policies that are more hostile to minorities than do state legislatures. In response to
Gamble (1997), who argues that direct legislation facilitates tyranny over minorities, the
authors argue that while this may occur on a local level, it is unlikely to happen on a state
level, for much the same reason that Madison predicted in Federalist 10 - enlargement.

The word “tolerance” as used here is apparently meant to imply some degree o f
equality, or a lack o f tyrannical measures. The choice o f words, however, could lead
some to argue that “tolerance” presupposes that one side has a superior position, and
simply “allows” the other to exist - subject to recall at whim.
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When the eleetorate has been inereased beyond the munieipal level, polieies are less
likely to be abusive o f minority rights.
The study o f direet demoeraey and its impaet on minorities is an extraordinarily
interesting and worthwhile pursuit. As the number o f minorities inerease in Ameriea and in many areas, eonstituting a majority-minority - the tension between minorities and
nonminorities has inereased as well. The eoneurrent rise in the use o f direet demoeraey
should motivate the study in order to ensure that the proeess preserves and protects the
rights o f all Americans. In particular, further research could focus on the role o f the
courts as a eounter-majoritarian force in American society, and whether they are holding
to that notion when direct democracy is concerned, and further, if the conditions for anti
minority voting behavior discovered by Tolbert and Hero hold in other locales as well.
Again, attention must be paid to the relative difficulty in qualifying a measure for the
ballot, as well as the relative popularity o f a measure in relation to the vote share. This is
because in majority-minority districts, a majority o f voters may still be non-minority. In
other words, if minorities make up the large majority o f the district, but yet constitute an
excessive minority o f the actual voting population, rights o f minorities are more likely to
be abused.

State Legislatures
Scholars writing in the early part o f the twentieth century were well aware o f the
problems of the state legislatures. In particular, Sanborn (1908) argued that state
legislators o f the period often enacted laws that were “unwise, uncalled for, illconsidered, or positively bad” and that they often took the form o f favoring special
interest groups (though this occurred more often in municipal councils than in state
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legislatures), that the laws may unnecessarily interfere in human conduct and thus not
conducive to laissez faire governmental practice, or conversely, that the legislature may
not be passing laws which would be in the public’s best interest. The notion that state
legislatures were problematic because o f special interest influence was also realized in
states that did not necessarily consider themselves “progressive.” Thomas (1914) writes
that Arkansas in the early twentieth century was noted for its expensive and ineffective
legislature; however, attempts to bring direct democracy to the state failed on the first
attempt. Though later attempt were successful, the state process found considerable
opposition in the form o f the state supreme court (Thomas 1914). Later scholars argued
along the same lines: Bolton (1971) argues that while legislators have “great power to
make policy,” the power is generally used to formalize polieies that have been developed
outside the legislatures, and most often with special interest groups or state bureaucracies
(Bolton 1971, 57).
State legislatures are a dynamic institution. Indeed, legislatures have been the focus
o f many scholars over the years. Recently, Rosenthal (1996) identified three perspectives
from which state legislatures are viewed: legislative reform (from the 1960s to the
1970s), legislative professionalism (1980s), and legislative institutionalization (1990s).
Rosenthal argues that the first perspective, legislative reform, was motivated in large part
by an evaluation report authored by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, which
made both general recommendations as well as individual state level recommendations.
In particular, Rosenthal notes that the most important consequence o f this era was that of
institutional capacity - which helped both legislatures and legislators. Institutional
capacity in this sense refers to the notion o f inereased physical space, inereased time, and
increased information. Additionally, equalizing the domination that had occurred
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between the legislative and executive branches was also a goal; this came to fruition in
many states via the budget process - no longer would the legislatures “rubber stamp” the
governor’s budget.
The second perspective, legislative professionalism, was largely geared towards
making state legislatures better emulate the U.S. Congress. However, conceptual
differences abound among scholars as to what should constitute “professionalism.”
Though the concept will be discussed below, Rosenthal argues that a consequence o f
legislative professionalism is that it generally attracts professional legislators, which in
turn further professionalizes the legislature, which again in turn attracts more professional
legislators.
The third perspective is that o f legislative institutionalization. This perspective
considers Polsby’s (1968) definition of legislative institutionalization at the national level
and applies it to the state level. Briefly, legislatures are institutionalized when (1)
organization is well-bounded and differentiated from its environment; (2) the
organization is relatively complex, with separated functions (i.e., committee structures);
and (3) the organization relies on universaliStic criteria and automatic rather than
discretionary methods for conducting and managing internal business. Though state
legislatures can be defined as having well-defined boundaries, the notions o f complexity
and universalistic criteria find little support when applied to state legislatures. However,
Rosenthal (1996) argues that the “relaxation” o f quantified measures may be in order, as
suggested by Polsby. Thus, by focusing on “boundedness” (i.e., the separation o f the
institution from its environment) Rosenthal argues that not only did almost all state
legislatures become institutionalized at one point, a new, (and fourth) perspective can be
realized - that o f institutional decay - or, deinstitutionalization.
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Legislative deinstitutionalization can be seen in three main factors; personnel
differentiation, adherence to norms, and managerial autonomy. In particular, Rosenthal
(1996) argues that personnel differentiation is seen in increased levels of turnover within
state legislatures (attributed in part to redistricting efforts, gains on the part of Republican
officeholders, especially in the south, and the initial effects o f term limits), that adherence
(or in this case, non-adherence) to norms can be seen in decreased levels o f institutional
loyalty (conceptualized of in terms o f members running “against” the legislature in
campaigns) and finally, managerial authority has been limited by tenn limits, and important for this thesis - initiatives and referenda that circumvent legislative autonomy,
such as tax and expenditure limitations.
The notion o f institutionalization was also studied by Berry, Berkman and
Schneiderman (2000) who argued that legislative professionalism promotes legislative
institutionalization by establishing boundaries that shield members from external shocks.
Thus, not only do members from a more professional legislature have a higher likelihood
o f winning reelection, but such professionalization also “buffers” the member from
external political forces, the effects of national economic conditions, and the coattail
effect. In such a situation, a Democratic state legislator is less likely to face a
disadvantage even if a Republican president wins a landslide re-election on the coattails
o f a very strong economy. Insofar as the effect o f both national conditions and coattails
(this time in the sense o f higher office elections) has weakened over time when
considering national legislative elections, the correlation between increased resources and
such weakening in both national and sub-national legislatures indicated that the declining
influence o f national forces has been caused by increases in congressional resources
(Berry,

Berkman

and

Schneiderman

2000:
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871).

However,

the

benefits

of

institutionalization on members o f the legislatures do not proteet against the
deinstitutionalization proeess deseribed earlier by Rosenthal (1996) and in partieular,
against the imposition o f authority by the people via direet demoeraey.
Weber (1999) argues that the institutional arrangement of state legislatures is
problematic. In particular, he notes that state legislators may have too much self-interest
in the things that they control, such as legislating on issues in which they can not be
disinterested (e.g., district-drawing; staffing; resources) and that the ultimate consequence
of this is that it undermines the public confidence in the institution, and further
eontributes to the media focus o f corruption. Weber argues that reform measures, such as
independent district-drawing commissions, legislative expense commissions (that deal
with staffing and expenses, including legislator pay levels), campaign finance
commissions, and independent state ethics commissions will help to return public
confidence to the institution.
Exactly what constitutes professionalism within state legislatures is open to some
debate, though attempts to operationalize the variable all contain at least some degree o f
systemic similarities. For example, Grumm (1971) offered an index o f legislative
professionalism comprised of five variables: legislative compensation, length o f the
session, expenditures for legislative services and operations, the number of bills
introduced, and a “legislative services” based on the Citizens Conference o f State
Legislatures evaluation that was published in the same year. Other scholars followed
(Leloup 1978; Bowman and Kearney 1986; Squire 1992), but for the most part, based
their indices on the recommendations from the Citizens Conference of State Legislatures
report (1971).
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The CCSL evaluation (1971) was perhaps the first effort to systematically evaluate
state legislatures. In particular, their stated goals were to develop specific criteria for the
evaluation o f the technical capabilities o f the legislatures, and to collect data and rank the
state legislatures according to those specific criteria. The purpose o f such research was
fourfold: first, to focus the attention and concern o f the public on factors which may limit
the effective performance of some state legislators; secondly, to furnish diagnostic
indicators o f particular deficiencies and to give guidance for improvement; third, to
provide a benchmark with which to measure future improvements; finally, to generate
discussion on what constitutes effective legislative organization and procedure (CCSL
1971). The study developed the FAIIR (functional, accountable, informed, independent,
representative) evaluation system, which consisted of five general platforms with sub
platforms for each.
The first plank, function, is built upon six sub-platforms. First, the legislature must
have adequate time and flexibility to manage their workload imposed upon it. Secondly,
the legislature must adequate support staff, which may focus on specialized tasks (e.g.,
agency liaison) or more general tasks (e.g., clerical duties). Third, the legislature must
have adequate facilities, such as chambers and committee rooms; fourth, the structure of
the legislature must be such that there are neither too few nor too many standing
committees, as well as assignments per committee. The fifth plank is that o f procedures,
which may include the use o f occasional joint committees, or provisions for emergency
measures; and finally, a legislature must contain leadership (though it should be diffuse
and constrained) and bipartisan participation in various management aspects of
operations, such as scheduling, space assignment, etc. (CCSL 1971).
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The second plank, accountability, consists of three components. First, the council
argues that the form o f the legislature be comprehensible, and this is achieved with
single-member districting, selection o f leaders by the full house, published rules and
procedures, the availability of explicit institutions, devices, and documents for planning,
budgeting and scheduling. Secondly, the council argues that public access to the
institution is essential, both in terms o f actual physical access, as well as access to the
proceedings. Finally, legislative accountability requires some degree o f equality among
members in the ability to influence legislation.
Third, the legislature must be informed; that is, the information it receives should be
over and above that o f executive agencies and interest groups - and it should have the
infrastructure in place to cultivate, manage, and deploy such information to the members.
This can be buttressed by providing adequate pre-session time for review, by the use o f
standing committees for informational purposes, and improving the form and character of
bill documents.
Fourth, legislatures should be independent. In particular, the legislature should enjoy
autonomy in legislative activities (e.g., control over the frequency, duration, and agendas
of legislative sessions, districting and apportionment plans) as well as from the executive
branch. Moreover, an independent legislature should have oversight capabilities,
lobbyists should be required to register (and this information should be transparent to the
public), and conflicts o f interest (e.g., holding multiple offices, employment o f relatives,
possibilities o f commercial ties between legislators and state or government officials)
should be eliminated.
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Finally, the CCSL (1971) argues that the legislature should be representative. This
includes a diverse legislature (in terms o f age, race, and backgrounds), as well as be
effective (tempered by increased size o f the legislature and concentrated leadership).
Keeping in mind that the rankings are ordinal in their distribution, rather than interval or
cardinal, the results are not surprising. In 1971, California was ranked as having the most
professional legislature, with New York, Illinois, and Florida following. Alabama ranked
fiftieth, while North Carolina, Delaware, and Wyoming ranked just above.
Perhaps more important for the purposes o f this study, however, is the discussion
regarding the “correlates of legislative capability.” In this section the CCSL (1971)
reports correlations between regional/geographic factors, demographic/socioeconomic
factors, historical/cultural factors, political factors and legislative capability in an effort to
appropriate the significance o f their original rank-order findings o f legislative
professionalism. Many o f the explanatory variables used here will also be used in the
upcoming quantitative analysis, and will be discussed in greater detail then. Using
Spearman’s rank-order correlation measurements, the CCSL’s findings can be summed
as follows. First, they find that factors such as population size, population density, level
of industrialization, and legislative centralization are not associated with legislative
capability. Secondly, legislatures ranking high in capability are more likely to be in
wealthier states, in states with professional legislatures, competitive and cohesive parties,
and local governments. Third, legislative capability is inversely related to one-party
dominance. Finally, regional clustering does exist, and is most pronounced in the north
central (most capable) and Southeast (least capable).
Finally, the CCSL (1971) report argues that there are specific policy consequences
for more capable and professional legislatures. In particular, they argue that “highly
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capable legislatures tend to be generally innovative in many different areas of public
policy, generous in welfare and education spending and services...” (CCSL 1971: 77).
State legislatures have, for the most part, undergone an overall transformation
towards professionalization in terms o f increased support staff, benefits and pay, longer
sessions, and more overall space (Morehouse and Jewell 2003; Rosenthal 1996). State
legislative reforms may also have an effect on the motivation and incentives that potential
candidates consider, and may result in an increase of “career” legislators (Maestes 2000).
Indeed, the trend towards professionalization has led scholars to argue that the
institutionalization of the institution o f state legislatures is becoming more like that o f the
U.S. Congress, with King (2000) in particular noting that as o f the date o f his writing,
legislatures operated with nearly three-fourths of the resources o f a national legislature,
compared to less than half in the 1960’s. In many states, increased legislative
professionalism has led to term-limit movements, as the argument was made that
legislators sought to take advantage o f the increased in pay, staff, and resources by
securing their positions in office, or by seeking advancement to higher office, rather than
adequately attending to the needs of their constituents (King 2000).
State legislative professionalism has had (perhaps unintended) consequences. For
example, the relationship between professional legislatures, progressive ambition, and
legislative responsiveness was

analyzed by Maestes

(2000), who

argued that

professionalization was likely to attract legislators with progressive ambition who in turn
would be more likely to identify and respond to the interests and concerns o f their
constituents. Thus, Maestes finds that states with more professional legislatures (and
more advancement opportunities) have greater aggregate opinion-policy congruence
while controlling for the effects o f electoral competition and alternative policy influences.
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This is mainly because “progressively ambitious politicians seek to maximize political
support over the long term across an expanding set of constituencies” (Maestes 2000,
669) which in turn overcomes the notion that legislators may not be responsive to
constituents even with the presence o f non-competitive elections.

Further, since

progressive ambition for higher office often includes offices with wider geographical
territories (and thus, more constituents), such legislators tend to balance the interests and
policy preferences of these individuals as well. Thus, such that institutionalization of
legislatures provides insulation for members, legislative outcomes in professional
legislatures can still be more responsive to broad-based constituent preferences.
State legislative professionalism also varies widely across states. Morehouse and
Jewell (2003) provide the intuitive argument that the larger states, such as California and
New York, deal with varied populations and complex issues, and thus are likely to be
more professional. However, other factors may be at work in determining the level of
legislative professionalism within a given state. Mooney (1995) addresses this question
directly, noting that the answer has meaningful implications: policy outputs and political
processes are likely to be dependent upon the levels of professionalization within the
state legislature. For Mooney, state legislative professionalism is affected by three
general types o f influence: the economic and social characteristics o f its citizens, the
institutional structure o f the state political system, and the polieies o f peer states (Mooney
1995,49).
These three general types o f influence are highly informative for the purposes o f this
work, and their details will be discussed here. First, Mooney argues that the economic
and social characteristics o f the state inform legislative professionalism as a function o f
the overall population level, the heterogeneity o f the population, and the gross state
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product per capita. In particular, a higher population is likely to lead to greater state
financial resources (via an increased tax base via inereased personal and business
income) with which to pay a more professional legislature. Increases in gross state
product per c a p i t a a l s o have a positive effect on legislative professionalism, for much
the same reason. Additionally, the heterogeneity of the population will likely affect the
levels of legislative professionalism, as the differences in values may make policy
responsiveness more difficult to achieve, which in turn creates value for legislative
professionalism.
Secondly, the institutional structure o f the state political system is, for Mooney,
highly influential in determining state level legislative professionalism. In particular,
institutional structure refers to five individual variables: apportionment fairness, legal
restrictions on legislative session length, opportunities for members to advance
politically, the formal powers o f the governor’s office, and bureaucracy size.
Court-ordered ends to state legislative malapportionment in the 1960s brought an
end to legislatures that were dominated by rural interests primarily interested in
maintaining the status quo (Mooney 1995, 50). Additionally, the presence of either a
statute or constitutional amendment dictating legislative session length may affect
professionalization (at least in terms o f session length) as a constitutional amendment will
likely require a referendum, while a statute will likely require only the approval o f the
governor. Mooney’s argument that the opportunity for advancement influences legislative
professionalism supports M aestes’s (1995) (earlier-discussed) notion and can be passed

The author defines gross state product per capita as the measure o f the average level of
economic productivity of a state’s population, and as such, it is an indicator o f state
wealth independent o f population.
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over here. Mooney considers the formal power o f the governor’s office to be a factor
because a more powerful executive branch will motivate the legislature to increase its
capacity in an effort to maintain its influence in state policymaking; for Mooney, the
bureaucracy of the state is similar in this regard. In other words, a less powerful executive
branch and state bureaucracy requires fewer resources (and thus, less professionalization)
to maintain the influence desired.
Third, Mooney argues that the policies o f “sister-states” are likely to be influential,
insofar as the costs are likely to be less when a neighboring state has already adopted the
policy; that those states are likely to serve as a sort o f “pilot-study”, which can be altered
accordingly when instituted; and also that it is politically easier to follow another state in
adopting policies rather than lead the way. Thus, legislative professionalism, at least for
Mooney, may also be a function o f proximity.
Mooney’s data analyses result in interesting findings. Mooney finds statistical
support for his hypothesis that the state’s population size, political structures, and sister
state’s professionalism all positively affect legislative professionalism, and after a timeseries analysis, he also finds support for the notion that advancement opportunities,
population heterogeneity, gross state product per capita, and gubernatorial power had
positive effects on professionalization. Mooney concludes by noting that an increase in
legislative professionalism does not necessarily mean that the balance o f power would be
shifted to legislatures only; indeed, governors, interest groups, courts, and local
governments would also be strengthened (Mooney 1995:61).
If legislative professionalism can influence such things as incumbent reelection,
interest groups, courts, local governments, the state bureaucracy as shown here, can it
influence direct democracy? Perhaps. Gerber (1996, 1998) considers the role o f the
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initiative in affecting legislative behavior. In particular, she questions whether simply the
“threat” o f an initiative may influence legislative behavior. Insofar as legislators in states
that allow initiatives are expected to pass laws that more closely reflect that state’s
median voter’s preferences, Gerber determines that parental consent laws passed in
initiative states do more closely reflect their state’s median voter preferences when
compared to non-initiative states. The most salient aspect o f her work may be the finding
that interests groups can affect policy via the state legislature without actually proposing
initiatives - but simply by threatening them.
However, the relationship between state legislators and direct democracy may need
to be first examined in simpler terms: that o f institutional structure. Insofar as policies are
most likely to be determined by the state legislature, the structure o f that institution
(especially in terms of professionalization) may become an important predictor of statelevel policy outcome. More important for the purposes o f this thesis, however, is the
notion that state level professionalization may also affect another policy aggregator:
direct democracy. Such examinations are the focus o f the following chapters.

Conclusions
The salient issues in direct democracy today are much the same as they were a
century ago. Though the Progressive notion o f direct democracy providing educative
benefits to the citizenry proved elusive, the institution itself has presented itself as an
opportunity for citizens to have increased access to the process. Thus, voters are equipped
with a mechanism by which they may have a voice distinct from party allegiance, and by
which they may have increased control over the agenda. Perhaps most prominently, the
Progressive notion that the process o f direct democracy would place a check on special
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interests (at least in terms of their power over the agenda, as well as on other institutions
in the political arena) has proven not only unfounded, but also ill-conceived. Scholarship
on direct democracy and policy outcomes suggest that states with the process generally
have policies in place that are closer to the median voter’s preferences; moreover, the
initiative and referenda appear to be the instrumental variable causing such an alliance.
However, previous works have not taken the time to further parse out the underlying
causes o f such correlations. For example, institutional theory suggests that institutions in
and of themselves do not cause outcomes; rather, institutions generally shape the political
interactions. Since “veto points” provide strategic openings that actors use to achieve
their goals, the structure o f the institutional arrangement becomes paramount in
understanding the nature of the influence o f one institution (state legislatures) over
another institution (direct democracy). While clearly the direction o f influence could be
studied in reverse (and such a project would be worthwhile), for the purposes o f this
thesis, it will be limited to examining the structure o f state legislatures (i.e., structure in
terms o f professionalization) in an attempt to understand the nature o f its influence on
direct democracy. Such examinations are the subject o f the following chapters
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CHAPTER 4

DATA AND METHODS
The preceding chapters evaluated the current state o f direct democracy relative to the
expectations o f its founders in an attempt to understand how the process has evolved into
an institution in its own right, as well as among other institutions within the political
arena. While many o f the founders intentions for the process o f direct democracy were
realized (e.g., increased control over the agenda, the ability to produce laws that
“checked” the power o f the state legislatures), others were not (e.g., breaking the hold of
well-heeled special interest groups over the policymaking process). However, to fully
understand the current relationship o f these three entities, a more detailed analysis is in
order. Because the proper operationalization o f variables is the hallmark o f quantitative
research, this chapter serves as an exploration o f the variables used to examine the
influence o f state legislative professionalism on the institution o f direct democracy. In
particular, this chapter reviews the research question o f this thesis, outlines the
hypotheses to be tested, and concludes with an in-depth examination o f the variables used
in the upcoming analysis.
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Research Question
This thesis focuses on the following question: what is the influence o f state legislative
professionalism on the institution o f direct democracy? While the natural relationship
between these two entities may seem indirect and distant at first, the analysis completed
in chapter two of this thesis should fully illuminate the often entwined relationship that
these two entities have. In states that allow direct democracy, the citizens o f that state
have recourse available to them when the state legislature is seen as unresponsive - or
perhaps, out o f touch with - the perceived needs o f the citizens. For social scientists, the
question should focus less on what “unresponsive” may actually mean and more on what
the likelihood o f one event causing another event to occur is. Thus, for the purposes o f
this thesis, state legislative professionalism will serve as the (testable) intervening
variable in measuring the frequency and type o f direct democracy initiatives appearing on
the ballots in the American states.

Hypotheses
The main hypothesis (H I) of this thesis is that increased state legislative
professionalism will result in initiatives appearing more frequently on statewide ballots.
On a superficial level o f analysis, the notion that legislative professionalism would result
in increased ballot initiative activity across states may seem counterintuitive: insofar as
professionalization should result in increased capacity to serve the needs o f the citizenry,
the perception would be that the people would seek other access points (such as the
initiative) less frequently in states that have increased legislative professionalization. That
is, if the legislature is more professional, then the citizenry should not adopt the
Progressive notion o f having to resort to the initiative as a “check” on the state
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legislatures; nor should they have to adopt the Populist notion o f having to resort to the
initiative to radically alter the status quo and seek legislation on their own. Indeed, a
professional legislature would (ideally) be professional enough to meet the needs o f the
citizenry such that excessive use o f the initiative would not be necessary.
However, scholars have recently begun to question this seemingly utopian description
o f the relationship between professionalized state legislatures and direct democracy. In
particular, Banducci (1998) argues that there are two main reasons why increased ballot
initiative activity is more likely to occur in states where the legislatures are more
professional. First, because legislatures are more professional, the campaigns are likely to
be more expensive, as the seats are likely to be more desirable. Increased campaign
expenses are likely to force the legislator to rely on increased interest group
contributions. In this situation, Banducci argues that legislators are going to be less likely
to favor one interest group over another, which in turn leads the groups to pursue their
agendas via the initiative. Secondly, Banducci argues that more professional legislatures
are likely to have “larger” agendas, which raises public expectations, but also increases
the difficulty in achieving objectives. This, she argues, could lead a dissatisfied public to
turn to the initiative.
Banducci's arguments are well-received and in large part form the foundation of this
work. However, the notion that legislators are less likely to favor one interest group over
another simply because they seek increased contributions from a wider array o f groups is
problematic. In particular, this situation is highly dependent upon the arrangements of
interest groups in a particular state. That is, in states in which few interest groups
populate the political arena, legislators are likely to going to strongly favor one group
over another. Though Banducci’s expectations regarding this relationship may be met in
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States wherein a signifieant number of groups exist, the likelihood of a state legislator
winning reeleetion in a state with a limited number o f interest groups declines rapidly
when sueh a legislator does not favor one group over another. Additionally, Banducei
may imply more competition than aetually exists; legislators may not have to ehoose one
group over another; the notion o f pluralism suggests that different groups pursue different
poliey areas; thus, legislators may rarely have to ehoose one group over another.
Banducci’s suggestions

notwithstanding,

the theoretical

expectations

o f the

institutionalist theory may provide a more efficient foundation for the hypothesis to be
tested here. That is, the relationship between the state legislature and the institution of
direet demoeraey is based on a struetural explanation, and the institutionalist theory
focuses on the structural relationship between institutions - thus, as explained in the
seeond ehapter, the notion that legislative professionalism may be seen as a sort o f “veto
point” that political actors use to aehieve their goals (within the eontext of institutional
dynamism).
This notion expands on Banducci’s (1998) argument in that increased interest group
activity (and by extension, increased ballot initiative activity) is associated with increased
legislative professionalism but does not provide for legislator action as a basis for interest
groups pursuing the initiative. Instead, the concept foeuses more on the sourees of
institutional dynamism previously discussed as a catalyst for action among individuals or
groups in the political arena. In other words, by eoneepmalizing the professionalization of
state legislatures as a change in the political balance o f power, and noting that this facet
o f institutional dynamism suggests that old institutions (in this case, the institution of
direct democracy) are put into service o f different ends (through “veto points”), the

85

notion of increased legislative professionalism being associated with higher levels o f
ballot initiative activity becomes clearer.
A secondary hypothesis (H2a) of this study involves the professionalization o f the
state legislatures and the types o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots here.
Specifically, I hypothesize that more professional legislatures will have increased ballot
initiatives dealing with governmental processes, such as term limits or tax-andexpenditure limitations. Moreover, I hypothesize that the same effect will hold when
considering initiatives dealing with economic issues (H2b), as well as with social and
moral issues (H2c). The root of this hypothesis is formed along the same lines as the first
hypothesis.

Data
The dataset for this analysis is comprised of citizen-sponsored initiatives appearing
on the ballots o f twenty-two states' over the ten year period of 1990-2000. These pooled,
cross-sectional data are organized by year, and then by state. In other words, a “case”
consists of the total number of initiatives appearing on the ballot in a given year. While
the majority of states hold statewide elections in even-numbered years, a handful o f states

' Though twenty-four states have the initiative process available to them, two were
eliminated from analysis: Nebraska and Illinois. Nebraska has a unicameral, non-partisan
legislature which presents problems for measuring professionalism as an influence on
direct democracy when other control variables (such as divided government) are
included; Illinois did not have any ballot measures during the entire decade.
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hold additional statewide elections in off-years as well , and thus, the final number o f
cases is 145.

Model Specification
The hypotheses discussed here will be tested using two separate models. For H I, the
dependent variable will be the number o f initiatives appearing on a statewide ballot in a
given election year. Given the structure o f the dependent variable (namely, a count
variable), the best available method to analyze the data is Poisson regression. However,
while initial tests show that the data resemble a Poisson distribution, these same tests also
revealed over-dispersion^ within the dependent variable. As Long and Freese (2006)
explain, the best approach to over-dispersion is to use an alternate regression model:
negative binomial regression. In particular, the model will be tested using negative
binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered on years. The clustering allows
for the reduction in the standard error that may arise from similarities across states
regarding ballot initiatives. In other words, several salient issues found a place on the
ballot of several states in similar years: term-limit questions dominated ballot in the mid1990s; as did tax-and-expenditure limitation questions and medical marijuana. The use of
robust standard errors clustered on years helps to overcome the statistical requirement
that all observations be independent o f one another.

^ Maine held statewide elections in each year between 1990-2000; Washington held
elections in each year except 1999; Mississippi held statewide elections in 1995 and
1999.
^ Over-dispersion occurs when the variance o f the distribution significantly exceeds the
mean o f the distribution. In this case, the mean o f the distribution was 3.4; the variance
was 13.5.
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For H2a, H2b, and H2c, the dependent variable will be the number o f each type of
initiative appearing on the statewide ballot in a given year. In order to reduce the
subjectivity involved in categorizing the variables into economic, social/moral, and
governmental process, the dependent variables are categorized into the three groups using
a two-stage process. First, I use the standardized categories assigned to each initiative by
the National Conference of State Legislatures. The NCSL uses a total of twenty-seven
different categories, although several o f them are rarely used. From there, I assigned each
o f the twenty-seven categories a (1) if it dealt primarily with an economic issue, a (2) if it
dealt primarily with social/moral issues, and a (3) if it dealt with governmental processes.
The end result collapsed the twenty-seven categories into three general categories.'* Since
these data are also expressed as count variables, and over-dispersion is again present
among them, negative binomial regression will also be used to test these hypotheses.
Main Independent Variable: State Legislative Professionalization
The main independent variable will be a measure of legislative professionalization for
each state over the decade. To be sure, defining and operationalizing legislative
professionalism has been the subject o f many scholarly works over the past few deeades
(Grumm 1971; CCSL 1971; Leloup 1978; Bowman and Kearney 1988; Weber, Tucker
and Brace 1991; Squire 1992; Van Dunk and Weber 1997), though Mooney (1994) offers
a succinct definition o f the term: “ [sjtate legislative professionalism refers to the
enhancement of the capacity o f the legislature to perform its role in the policymaking

Many initiatives deal with several topics, and some overlap between the three categories
may occur. The subjectivity o f this process has not been ignored. During the re-coding
phase, the text o f each initiative was analyzed to ensure proper placement into the three
categories, and care was taken to ensure that the initiative was placed in the category that
best fit the description. See Appendix 1 for details.

process with an expertise, seriousness, and effort comparable to that o f other actors in the
proeess” (Mooney 1994: 71). In the same work, Mooney also considers the proper
operationalization o f state legislative professionalism by evaluating five indices provided
over the years by different scholars^. Mooney finds that the pairwise coefficients between
four o f the five indices examined are quite high,^ though Squire’s (1992) index of
legislative professionalism is deemed superior, especially when considering cases across
time, as this thesis does.
There are several advantages to Squire’s index o f legislative professionalism. First,
Squire (1992) developed his measure o f professionalization by using “relevant attributes
of Congress as a baseline against which to compare those same attributes in other
legislative bodies” (Squire 1992; 71). In particular, Squire focused on three simple
attributes: member pay, staff members per legislator, and total days in session. Mooney
(1994) argues that this methodology facilitates cross-year comparisons because the
ratings are based on a common standard; as such, a state’s score on this index is
“dependent only on its level on these variables as compared to Congress, and the level or
variability o f other states on them has no influence on its score” (Mooney 1994: 75).
Moreover,

Mooney

argues

that while the other indices may have measured

professionalism on more than these three (perhaps overly simplistic) variables, the high
^ In particular, Mooney evaluates the first widely used index, developed by John Grumm
(1971); a similar but slightly expanded index developed by Morehouse (1983) the widely
cited index provided by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (1971); an index
developed by Bowman and Kearney (1988) that focused on the objective measurements,
such as committee assignments and overall legislative size; and a tripartite index
developed by Peverill Squire (1992).
®The lowest pairwise correlation coefficient between these four variables is .767; the
highest is .865. The weaker correlation occurs between the CCSL (described above) and
the other four indices.
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correlation between this index and the more comprehensive indices suggests a high
degree of validity within Squire’s (1992) index. Given the strength o f Mooney’s
empirical analysis, this thesis will utilize Squire’s (1992) index o f legislative
professionalism as the main independent variable.^
Control Variables
A properly specified model is a critical step in obtaining parameter estimates that one
can be confident in. Towards that end, the two models presented here make use o f a
number o f important control variables. The first o f the two models considers the
influence o f legislative professionalism on the frequency o f initiatives appearing on
statewide ballots. Thus, I first implement a control variable that considers the strength of
interest groups within a given state.
The interest group strength index used here was developed by Hrebnar and Thomas
(2002) and ranks state-level interest group performance among five categories: dominant,
dominant/complementary, complementary, complementary/subordinate, and subordinate.
For the purposes o f this thesis, the categories were ranked one through five, with
subordinate as one and dominate as five^. Hrebnar and Thomas find that that interest
groups (as a whole, rather than categorized by sector or purpose) listed in the dominant
category had an overwhelming and consistent influence on public policymaking. A clear
example o f this would be Nevada (the collective effects o f gaming and mining interests).

^ Squire’s (1992) index was developed using data for the early 1990’s. Though this thesis
encompasses a period o f ten years (1990-2000) Mooney (1994) argues that “the relative
position o f states on legislative professionalism has not changed greatly over the last
thirty years” and thus, the index should provide an adequate level o f professionalization
over the period included in this study.
* Hrebnar and Thomas do not use this ordered type o f index; it was created by this author
to facilitate statistical analysis.
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The “eomplementary” eategory indicates that groups do not overly dominate the process,
but rather are limited in their ability to influenee poliey, and instead work in tandem with
other aspects o f the political system in a given state. Though no state has - now or ever been ranked as having subordinate interest groups, this eategory would obviously indieate
that groups within that state have little to no power in influencing state poliey.
The advantages of this index are threefold. First, the authors developed the index
using both qualitative and quantitative methods involving questionnaires and interviews
with state public officials and exploring and expanding on current literature in the
diseipline. This allows for the strengths o f prior research to present itself here. Secondly,
the study assessed overall interest group power in all fifty states on five oeeasions (1985,
1989, 1994, 1998, and 2002). This methodology benefits this study in two ways: first, it
has considered interest group power before, during, and after the period eovered by this
work; secondly, trend analysis shows that the ratings are quite stable over time, in terms
of both types o f group making an overall impaet, as well as the overall strength rating
(Thomas and Hrebner 2002: 118). This suggests that using a single five-fold index across
the period of 1990-2000 will not contaminate the statistieal parameters. Third, the index
eonsiders the group power o f speeial interests, rather than a simple measure o f the
number o f interest groups in a given state. The result is a better indieation o f how
powerful (and thus, more likely to be suceessful) interest groups are within a given state.
This prohibits undue influence on the statistieal model used here from single issue groups
that may achieve prominence due to inereased (but perhaps short-term) issue saliency
(e.g., term-limit or gay-marriage movements).
Seeondly, I eontrol for variation in the level o f diffieulty o f having an initiative
placed on the ballot. Signifieant variation exists between states in areas sueh as quantity
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of signature requirements, geographic restrictions governing signature requirements, the
time required to circulate a petition, whether statutes may be allowed or if the voters are
limited to constitutional amendments, and subject matter requirements (Magelby 1984;
Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998; Cronin 1989). Bowler and Donovan (2004b)
provide an excellent index o f qualification difficulty that considers each o f these
components and is relevant to the period under consideration^.
Third, I control for variations in population that may affect the number o f questions
appearing on a statewide ballot. Clearly, the population o f California (especially when
considered in the context o f their well-known penchant for direct democracy) should be
controlled for'°. Along these same lines, state-level gross domestic product is also
included as a control variable to account for differences that may occur between states
that use the initiative process but have significant differences in industrial output. Indeed,
Mooney (1995) argues that both population and state gross domestic product may
(independently) produce differences in state legislative professionalization, and thus
provides justification for their inclusion as control variables. Population data are taken
from the U.S. Census Bureau; state level gross domestic product data are taken from the
U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f Economic Analysis (BEA).

®In particular, the authors assign a higher score (indicating increased difficulty) to a state
if only statutes or only constitutional amendments are allowed; if the length o f the
qualifying period is limited; if a higher geographic distribution o f signatures is required;
if the signature requirement is between 7-10%; if the signature requirement exceeds 10%;
if substantive limits are in place regarding the subject matter o f initiatives (Bowler and
Donovan 2004: 138).
It should be noted that increased population does not automatically lead to an increase
in ballot initiatives. In the five statewide elections that occurred between 1990-2000,
California voters decided seventy-one initiatives; however, in the same period Oregon
voters (with nearly one-tenth o f the population) decided seventy-three.
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Fourth, I consider institutional factors by controlling for different levels of divided
government. In particular, the data have been coded for divided government on two
levels: between chambers within the state legislature, and between the state legislature
and the executive branch. In order for the legislature and the exeeutive to be considered
divided, both chambers o f the legislature must have had majorities from the same party
while the executive belonged to another party. In the case o f an evenly-split ehamber in
the legislature, the arrangement was eonsidered divided. Independents were coded
according to their leanings, as provided by the Book o f States^ ^. Thus, an Independentleaning-Republican was coded as a Republican.'^
Additional control variables populate the seeond model that focuses on the type
(rather than the frequency) o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots. Considering
frequeney and type are wholly independent o f eaeh other, while some of the same control
variables will be used in the latter as in the former, they should be considered as
neeessary but not sufficient to fully explain variation in the new model.
Examining the types o f initiative that appear on statewide ballots - and to be more
preeise, attempting to explain the causes behind their appearance - can be a daunting
task. To properly understand why more social/moral issues may appear on a partieular
state’s ballot more often than another state, or why économie issues appear more
frequently in one state over another, the researeher must have (at the very least) a general
understanding o f the citizens (and in particular, the political “culture”) o f the given state.

' ' All data used to construct the divided government variable was taken from the Book o f
States (various editions).
Between 1990-2000, only two governors were labeled as independent; both were
eonsidered “leaning Republican” : Alaska’s Walter Hickel (1990-1994) and Maine’s
Angus King (1995-2003).
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Operationalizing such a variable, however, is fraught with peril. In an attempt to
overcome these dangers, I have included three variables to account for state-level
political culture and ideology.
First, I turn to a long-respected measure o f political culture defined by Daniel Elazar
(1972). Elazar’s central thesis is that states are essentially civil societies within a larger
political society. As such, Elazar argues that while contesting groups within the state’s
civil society may find that they occasionally have more in common with members of
other states, there are many more intrastate substantive issues that concern the majority of
citizens within a given state. For the purposes of this thesis, the importance lies in
Elazar’s argument that these interests generally concern a large portion o f the population,
but not necessarily the interest o f the “state” itself (Elazar 1972:10). At the same time,
differences in “political culture” exist among states. In this sense, political culture is
defined as “particular patterns o f orientation to political action”, and is “rooted in the
cumulative historical experiences of particular groups o f people” (Elazar 1972:89). Since
states operate as civil societies within a larger civil society, Elazar argues that variations
exist in state-level responses to the federalist system processes. In other words, different
states view the relationship between the states and the federal system in different ways,
and these variations can be explained in terms of a state’s political culture. Elazar argues
that that there are three political cultures at work: individualistic, moralistic, and
traditionalistic.
To be more precise, Elazar argues that the three political cultures presented reflect a
synthesis o f two fundamental conceptions o f the American political order: the first is a
political order conceived of as a marketplace, wherein public relationships are the
products o f bargaining among individuals and groups acting out o f self-interest; the
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second is a political order conceived o f as a commonwealth - a “state in which the whole
people have an undivided interest - in which the citizens cooperate in an effort to create
and maintain the best government in order to implement certain shared moral principles”
(Elazar 1972:91). Finally, Elazar adds that a particular civil society’s conceptions o f the
“uses of power and the nature o f justice” are important aspects of its political culture.”
To illustrate, Elazar describes an individualistie political culture as one in which there
is limited intervention into private activities in an effort to allow widespread access to the
marketplace. The moralistic political culture, however, focuses less on the marketplace
and more on the commonwealth as the purpose of government, and in this sense, politics
is viewed as a tool to translate “power” for the betterment o f the commonwealth. In this
ease, politicians “serve the community,” and thus, issues often set the agenda for political
actors.

In particular, government is considered “a positive instrument with a

responsibility to promote the general welfare” (Elazar 1972: 97). Finally, the
traditionalistic political culture both views the marketplace with “ambivalence” and
views the commonwealth with a “paternalistic and elitist conception.” Although the
traditionalistic culture shares with the moralistic culture the view that good governance
means involvement in the community, the focus shifts to maintaining the existing social
order through eonfming politieal power to an elite few.
It has long been understood that while Elazar’s work is highly impressionistic, its
contribution to the discipline has been well-received, and despite its age, is still used
today (Fitzpatrick and Hero, 1988; Gray and Lowery 2004). Though the work lacks an
interval level variable to include, others (Sharkansky 1969) have expanded his work such
that an interval level index has been achieved. Following Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1993),
I have adapted the interval level variable for use in this dataset.
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Secondly, I include a variable o f state-level (self-reported) ideology as developed by
Wright, Melver, and Erikson (1993). These authors have aggregated the results of
CBS/New York Times national polls between 1976-2003, and in partieular provide a
measure o f the pereentage of self-deseribed liberals, moderates, and eonservatives at the
state level. Such a measure should provide excellent eontrol for state-level ideology, and
in particular, help to eontrol for differences in all three categories (e.g., eeonomie,
soeial/moral, and governmental proeess initiatives examined.) To faeilitate proper
statistical analysis, the reported levels o f ideology were taken on a year-by-year basis
(1990-2000) and added to the dataset.
Finally, I inelude an index o f religious attitudes at the state level. Because religious
identifieations have been shown to be highly eorrelated with partisan identifications,
inclusion o f such a variable will further control for differences in the population.
Moreover, Cook, Jelen and Wileox (1993, 771) suggest that residents o f different states
hold political opinions that are significantly different, even after controlling for
demographic variables. In sueh a ease, religious attitudes may help to explain differences
in values and orientations towards salient issues that appear on ballot initiatives. The
index was created by collapsing state-level religious participation data derived from the
Ameriean Religious Identifieation Survey into three groups: Mainline Protestants,
Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics’^. To facilitate data analysis, I present the variable
as a pereentage o f Evangelicals within a given state.

The ARIS breaks down the religious participation data into twenty-four denominations
(e.g., Chureh o f Christ, Pentecostal, Church o f God, etc). Following Jelen and Chandler
(1996), I have assigned eaeh eategory to one o f the three groups listed here. See
Appendix two for details.
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Conclusions
The current chapter seeks to build on the prior chapters concerning the influence o f
one institution (the state legislatures) over another (direct democracy) while considering
other actors in the political arena (the state population, as well as interest-groups) within
the context o f the institutionalist theory. In so doing, this chapter outlines the relevant
variables required to conduct a robust quantitative analysis. A properly specified model is
a eritieal component in achieving confidence in the parameter estimates provided by sueh
quantitative teehniques as negative binomial regression. The following ehapter will
undertake these analyses.
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CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS
The focus of this chapter is the testing o f the two main hypotheses outlined in the
previous chapter. To briefly review, I hypothesize that increases in legislative
professionalism will result in an overall increase in the frequeney o f initiatives appearing
on statewide ballots (H I). On a secondary level, I also hypothesize that inereased
legislative professionalism will increase the number o f governmental proeess initiatives
appearing on statewide ballots (H2a), as well as inerease the number o f social/moral
issues (H2b) and also economic issues (H2c).
As discussed earlier, the dependent variable is the number o f initiatives appearing on
statewide ballots for the period 1990-2000, organized by year. Thus, a single year
eonstitutes a case, while each case has the eorresponding number o f initiatives appearing
on the ballot in that year. Though most states that have the proeess available to them did
have initiatives appearing on the ballot in eaeh o f the statewide eleetions during the
decade, some did not, and were eounted as zero’. Since the dependent variable is a eount
variable, and because events occur within a specific time period, the methodology o f
choice is Poisson regression (Lawless 1987). However, initial deseriptive statistical tests

’ Illinois did not have any initiatives appear on the ballot in the 1990’s, and so was
excluded entirely from this study.
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revealed a possible complication. Specifically, Poisson regression assumes an equal mean
and variance for the dependent variable. Inspection o f the dependent variable (tbe number
o f questions per year, per state) reveals a significant difference between the mean and
variance; such a situation is termed over-dispersion. As Long and Freese (2006, 376)
point out, if over-dispersion is present, estimates from the Poisson regression model are
inefficient with standard errors that are biased downwards, regardless o f proper model
specification. As tbis is clearly tbe case witb tbese data, I follow Long and Freese (2006)
and adopt negative binomial regression in order to analyze these data.

Hypothesis 1 Results
Table 4.1 presents tbe results for hypothesis 1: the frequency o f ballot initiatives as
the dependent variable; legislative professionalism as the main independent variable, and
initiative qualification difficulty, state-level interest group strength, state-level gross
domestic product, and population as control variables.
As expected, state legislative professionalism appears to positively influence tbe
frequency of initiatives appearing on statewide ballots. Moreover, the magnitude of the
coefficient suggests that the influence is quite strong, when holding all other variables
constant. Indeed, a unit increase in legislative professionalism increases tbe expected
number o f initiatives in a given state by a factor of 4.5; to be more precise, a one standard
deviation unit increase in legislative professionalism increases tbe expected initiatives in
a given state by 1.29.

99

TABLE 5.1
HYPOTHESIS 1
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVES
Variable

Coefficient

Robust S.E

Legislative Prof

1.506

0.527

236

0,004

Qualification Diff

-0.423

0.022

-19.13

(1000

Interest Grp Strength

0.371

0.110

3.37

0.001

State GDP

&280

2.230

-1.18

0238

Population

-2.630

(L830

fr92

0358

Constant

1.215

0323

3Y6

0.000

ln(o!)

-1.160

a

0 JI3

N

145

G-

Z-Score

Significance

&000

Note: Robust standard error statistic clustered by year.

As expected, for eaeh unit inerease in the qualification difficulty index, the expected
number o f initiatives decreases by a factor o f 0.6, which translates to a decrease of
34.5%. Also as expected, as interest group strength in a given state increases, so do the
n u m b e r of expected initiatives, in this case by a factor of 1.45, or 29%^. Neither

population nor state-level GDP had a statistically significant impact on the frequeney o f

The statistical program used to run these analyses (Stata, V.IO) provided the
additional calculations for these data by utilizing the Tistcoef ’ command.
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ballot initiatives. Before considering the result for legislative professionalism, further
analysis may be in order.
Table 5.2 presents a similar model but with additional variables. I include a control
variable for a divided legislature, and another representing divided government between
the legislature and the exeeutive.

TABLE 5.2
HYPOTHESIS 1
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE E4ITIATIVES
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT

Variable

Coefficient

Robust S.E

Z-Score

Significance

Legislative Prof

1.370

0359

2.08

0337

Qualification D iff

-0.407

0356

-7 2 4

0300

Interest Grp Strength

0326

0T28

235

0.011

State GDP

<1760

7A20

0.91

0362

Population

-2320

2.710

-1.04

0299

Div Legislature

0.070

0T73

0.40

0.686

Div Leg/Exee

0T34

0T68

(180

0.423

Constant

1.930

0370

3.23

0.001

ln(a)

-1.199

a

0.301

N

145
&000

Note: Robust standard error statistic clustered by year.

101

Interestingly, divided government does not appear to play a contributing factor in the
frequeney o f statewide ballot initiatives. When holding all other variables constant,
neither variable achieves statistical significance. Moreover, the inclusion of divided
government as a eontrol variable does not significantly change the direction or magnitude
o f the main independent variable, suggesting that legislative professionalism contributes
to inereased ballot initiative activity regardless o f the level o f policy gridlock that may or
may not be oeeurring because o f divided government.
Further analysis supports the notion that divided government has little apparent
effect on the frequeney o f statewide initiatives. Table 5.3 considers the opposite
condition; a united legislature and exeeutive branch - in this case, with the Democrats in
eontrol.
In this case, the presence o f a united government - a Democrat-controlled
government - leads to a slight decrease in statewide initiatives. However, the magnitude
of the coefficient suggests that, while statistically significant, the effect is minimal. When
replaced by a variable measuring a Republican majority in both branches, the relationship
becomes insignificant. Interestingly, this pattern holds when isolating the legislature.
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TABLE 5.3
HYPOTHESIS 1
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVE
LEGISLATURE/EXEC UNITED - D

Variable

Coefficient

Robust S.E

Z-Score

Significance

Legislative Prof

I.5I2

0308

238

0.003

Qualification D iff

-0.412

0320

-20.61

0.000

Interest Grp Strength

0366

0.100

335

0300

State GDP

6.501

7.406

038

0380

Population

-2320

2334

-1.26

0209

Leg/Exec United- D

-0.223

0.089

-2 4 9

0.013

Constant

1.224

0319

332

0.000

ln(o!)

-1.191

.0.290

a

0302

(1879

N

145
3263

6366

Note: Robust standard error statistic clustered by year.

A Democrat-led legislature results (Table 5.4) in decreases in the frequency of
ballot initiatives; a Republican-led legislature results (Table 5.5) in increases in the
frequency of ballot initiatives, and though the coefficient is not statistically significant
beyond the .05 level, it is significant beyond the less-stringent .10 level.
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TABLE 5.4
HYPOTHESIS 1
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVES
LEGISLATURE UNITED - D
Coefficient

Robust S.E

Legislative Prof

L592

0328

3.01

0303

Qualification D iff

-0.387

0322

-17.54

0300

Interest Grp Strength

0.317

0.094

3 35

0.001

State GDP

5260

6340

029

(1428

Population

-1.991

2.410

-0 3 2

0.410

Legislature United - D

-0.261

(1067

-335

0300

Constant

1.281

0306

4.16

0300

In(û')

-1.17

0285

a

0309

0388

N

145

Variable

3263

Z-Score

Significance

&666

Note: Robust standard error statistie clustered by year.

These results support prior findings (Bandueeil998) diseussed earlier , as well as the
hypothesis suggested here. That is, inereased levels o f legislative professionalism are
associated with inereased ballot initiative activity.

^ Banducci (1998) directly considers the role o f state legislative professionalism on the
institution o f direet demoeraey; moreover, the author finds that state legislative
professionalism is assoeiated with inereased ballot initiative frequeney. However,
Bandueei did not use a regression teehnique best suited to eount data whieh may have
biased the parameter estimates; additionally, the control variables included in this study
were expanded upon from the Banducci work.
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TABLE 5.5
HYPOTHESIS 1
FREQUENCY OF STATEWIDE INITIATIVES
LEGISLATURE UNITED - R
Variable

Coefficient

Robust S.E

Z-Score

Significance

Legislative Prof

L762

0383

4.61

0.000

Qualification D iff

-0390

(1018

-21.20

0.000

Interest Grp Strength

0.391

0.099

T94

0.000

State GDP

6.091

5.651

L08

0281

Population

-2301

2.042

-1 3 8

0.170

Legislature United - R

0 299

0.163

133

0.067

Constant

0366

0.317

223

0.006

ln(o)

-1.224

.0332

a

0296

0.098

N

145

G-

362&

&000

Note: Robust standard error statistie elustered by year.

Hypothesis 2 Results
The understanding that inereased legislative professionalism leads to increased ballot
initiative activity almost naturally leads to curiosity o f whether certain types o f ballot
initiatives appear more frequently given increases in legislative professionalism. The
following seetion examines this relationship. As discussed earlier, this thesis seeks to
improve our understanding o f how one institution (state legislative professionalism)
influences direet demoeraey. In the eontext o f eomparative state politics, the question of
what types o f initiatives are appearing on the ballot seeks explanation. The following
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multivariate model relies on the frequency o f three types o f initiatives appearing on
statewide ballots as individual dependent variables: economic initiatives, social/moral
initiatives, and governmental proeess initiatives. Though the eategorization used here
seems overly broad, the objeetive is to gain a probabilistie understanding o f the
relationship between the two institutions. By first understanding the broad-based nature
o f the relationship using the analyses presented here, more subtle distinetions regarding
subeategories o f initiatives ean be extrapolated from the results. In other words, if a
relationship is found between inereased legislative professionalism and increased
governmental proeess initiatives, then one ean, with inereased eonfidenee, assume that
such initiatives as expenditure limitations, term limitations, and redistrieting initiatives
would also see inereases. It is expeeted that this teehnique would apply to eaeh o f the
three eategories.
Table 5.6 displays the results o f the hypothesis"’. Surprisingly, inereased legislative
professionalism does not produee statistieally significant differences in the types of
initiatives appearing on statewide ballots, when holding all other variables eonstant.
Given the strength, direction, and magnitude o f the coefficient in the prior model, this is
puzzling. However, it may be useful to briefly diseuss the results o f the table before
exploring the relationship between legislative professionalism and types o f initiatives
appearing on statewide ballots.

Neither political culture nor state-level ideology was measured for Alaska, and thus the
N is reduced to 137.
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TABLE 5.6
HYPOTHESES 2a, 2b, and 2c
TYPE OF INITIATIVES APPEARING ON STATEWIDE BALLOTS
Variable

Legislative
Prof
Qualification
Difficulty
Interest Grp
Strength
Divided
Government Legislature
Divided
Government Leg/Executive
Political
Culture
Conservatives
Population
Constant

Governmental
Process

Social/Moral

Economic

0.561
(1.318)

0235
01915)

301
(0.868)

-0.301
(0.077)***

-0.419
(0.110)***

-0.499
(0.063)***

0379
(0.176)**

0.438
(0.207)**

0.142
(0.283)

0.017
(0.262)

-0395
(0.190)

0342
(0.207)

0.141
01239)

0381
(0.164)**

-0.114
(0.289)

-0.031
(0.058)

-0289
(0.103)**

0.019
(0.427)

-0.005
(0.026)

-0.024
01029)

-0.046
01315)***

245
(2.17)
0.092
(1.33)

2.45
(1.68)
1.49
(1.42)
-1.934
(1.24)
0.144
(0.178)

2.70
(1.32)
254
01793)
-0.773
0335
0.461
(0.154)

137

137

In(ct)

-1.217

a

0296

N

137

Note:. Entries are negative binomial coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered by
year) in parenthesis.
*p<.05. **p<.01. *** p<.001
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First, the most notable eharacteristic o f the table is the uniformity - and statistical
significance o f - the qualifieation diffieulty variable. As was the ease with the prior
model, inereased qualification difficulty leads to a uniform decrease in ballot initiatives
aeross states, and across types o f initiatives. In and of itself however, this is neither
surprising nor novel.
Seeondly, increased interest group strength shows a similar eoeffieient direetion and
strength in this model (however, this relationship fails to hold when eonsidering
economic types o f initiatives). Thus, it ean be dedueed from this analysis that inereased
qualifieation diffieulty has a negative effeet on the overall frequeney o f initiatives,
regardless o f type, while inereased interest group strength leads to an inerease in both
governmental proeess initiatives as well as social/moral initiatives, though not eeonomie
initiatives.
Interestingly, this relationship may present a slightly new angle on a well-deseribed
phenomenon within the institution o f direet demoeraey. As several scholars (e.g.,
Donovan et al. 1998; Gerber 1999) argue, broad-based interest groups are mueh more
likely to see success at getting initiatives placed on the ballot, while eeonomie interest
groups are mueh more likely to attempt to maintain the status quo by defeating initiatives
already plaeed on the ballot. Though these analyses do not attempt to delineate between
the types o f interest groups at work, the notion that interest group strength fails to predict
increased eeonomie initiatives may be an indicator that (economic) interest groups are not
attempting to pursue eeonomie initiatives, but rather eonfronting them after they have
already been plaeed on the ballot.
Third (and similar to the prior model), divided government does not appear to be a
signifieant predietor o f inereased ballot initiative activity, except for the relationship
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between social/moral initiatives and divided legislature and executive braneh. Here, the
analysis reveals that such a division does result in an increase in the expeeted initiatives
dealing with social/moral issues, when holding all other variables eonstant. Fourth, the
political culture also has a statistically significant relationship on social/moral initiative
activity. The data are coded in an interval level format, such that increases in the interval
designate a state moving farther away from the moralistic political culture and towards
the traditionalistic political culture. Thus, as a state moves closer towards the
traditionalistic end o f the political culture spectrum, the result is a decrease in the
social/moral initiative activity. Given Elazar’s description o f the traditionalistic culture^
the direction o f this coefficient is not surprising, and further confirms the validity of
Elazar’s longstanding work.
Finally, an interesting result is found in the “conservatives” variable, when
eonsidering eeonomie initiatives. This variable measures the amount o f self-deseribed
conservatives in a given state; though the magnitude o f the coefficient is not large, a
statistieally significant relationship does present itself: an inerease in the self-deseribed
eonservative’s population results in a slight deerease in eeonomie initiatives. Insofar as

^ As deseribed in the previous ehapter, the traditionalistie political culture plaees a
premium on maintaining the social order through eonfinement o f political power to an
elite few. Since the elite are not likely to use the initiative to maintain the status quo, but
rather to defend it (Gerber 1998), this relationship does make intuitive sense.
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the general notion that conservatives favor less intervention into the marketplace^, this
relationship seems to make intuitive sense^.
The relationship between state legislative professionalism and the institution of
direet demoeraey

is thus

limited.

Though

the relationship

between

inereased

professionalism and increased ballot initiative activity does seem well proven, no
statistical significance could be determined when the types of initiatives were eonsidered.
Understanding the nature o f this may be easier if a few “non-events” are considered. In
other words, by eonsidering what was not found, it may better demonstrate what was
found.
First, a negative relationship was found neither when considering frequeney only, nor
when considering type. Had this relationship been diseovered, the original argument
would have likely been proven true: a more professional legislature is better able to serve
the needs o f its eitizens sinee the eitizenry relies less on the “end-around” tactie o f the
ballot initiative. Secondly, a negative (statistieally significant) relationship was also not
found between the types o f initiatives; in this case, the similar argument eould be
presented for that type o f initiative. In other words, the argument eould be made that

^ The notion that conservatives favor less intervention into the eeonomie markets, while
widely understood and aeeepted, is far from universally aeeepted by all eonservatives.
Indeed, this relationship also assumes that the nature o f the initiatives is such that
intervention into the markets is the purpose o f the initiative, rather than prohibitions on
intervention.
^ As deseribed in the previous chapter, a control variable for religious attitudes (measured
as percentage o f religious fundamentalism by state) was also included in the model.
However, beeause o f the deereased sample size, a limit on the number of independent
variables exists. A separate analysis was run (not shown) that replaced this religious
participation variable with the political culture variable, and another was eonducted
replaeing the conservatives variable. Neither analysis produeed signifieant changes in the
model presented here.
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increased legislative professionalism does not neeessarily lead to more eontent eitizens
when the eeonomie (or social/moral, or governmental process) issues are eoneemed.
Third, no significant changes in neither magnitude nor direction o f the eoeffieient
occurred between the qualifieation difficulty index and decreased ballot initiatives across
all types. Finally, the strength and direction o f many o f the variables remained constant
when eonsidering both frequency and type; though statistical significance was not
achieved, the direetion of the professionalism eoeffieient remained positive.

Taken

together, this may indicate a positive relationship does exist in this model in a similar
manner to the prior model, but the limited sample size precluded statistical significance.
Regardless, statistieal significance was, at least on some levels, determined. However,
substantive signifieance within the context o f the provided theory should also be
eonsidered. Returning to the theoretical explanations regarding institutions, four sourees
o f institutional dynamism were identified. Briefly, they were: first, broad ehanges in the
soeioeeonomie or politieal eontext can produce a situation in which previously latent
institutions suddenly become salient, with implieations for political outcomes; seeondly,
ehanges in socioeconomic or political balance o f power produees a situation in whieh old
institutions are put in service o f different ends, as new actors come into play who pursue
their new goals through existing institutions; third, exogenous ehanges ean produce a
shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions: changes in
outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old institutions; and finally, political
actors adjust their strategies to accommodate ehanges in the institutions themselves.
The results developed here may support the institutionalists’ conception o f change
(through the framework o f institutional dynamism outlined above) in more ways than
one. First, if inereased legislative professionalism results in increased ballot initiatives, it
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may be the case that this change in the “political balance o f power” may have produced a
situation in which the old institution (the state legislature) was put into service towards
different ends. As Gerber (1998) explains, interest groups may pursue both direet and
indirect influence on the state legislature. Indirect influence may mean proposing and
placing a measure on the ballot that was never intended to pass - simply having the
legislature respond to a group’s threat or signals may be enough. Sinee the legislature is
more likely to be able to respond given inereased professionalism (mainly through
increased staff and resources, as well as session time), this may be an additional
explanation o f the inereased initiatives.
Seeondly, considering increased legislative professionalism as an exogenous change
with respect to the institution of direet democracy, sueh professionalization may produee
a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions. That is, the
inereased professionalism that likely leads to increased capacity would likely precede a
shift in the goals of the interest groups involved with the state legislature.

The fact that

the “interest group strength” eoeffieient was both positive and significant in the first
model supports this notion.
Finally, as outlined by Thelen and Steinmo, politieal actors may adjust their
strategies to accommodate ehanges in the institutions themselves. In this ease, politieal
actors may mean organized interest groups, or it may mean short-lived coalitions seeking
action on one issue; either way, if the change involved in the equation is inereased
legislative professionalism, then the adjustment may simply mean an alternative to the
progressive nature (or conversely, the static nature, given the possibility o f a
“traditionalistic” political culture) through the initiative process. In other words, the
inereased capacity within the state legislature ean be seen as a threat to the status quo; or
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it may be viewed as a sort of “empty shirt” type institution - capable o f producing but not
actually producing change. In either ease, the actor’s new action (in the sense that the
action is a result o f increased professionalization) is the initiative - regardless of intent to
preserve or change the status quo. This may be supported by the results o f the divided
government variable in the first model: regardless o f division or unity, ballot initiatives
inerease as professionalization inereases. In other words, neither perceived “gridlock” nor
“streamlining”

affects

the

frequency

o f initiatives

to

the

same

degree

that

professionalization does. Thus, the theoretical actor who proposes the initiative may not
be wholly concerned with the capacity o f the legislature so mueh as he is eoneemed with
the actual output, and adjusts his actions accordingly.
Thus, the possible “veto points” eonsidered in ehapter one become slightly clearer:
conceptual “weaknesses” in the political institutions that structure actors’ decision
making processes regarding placing an initiative on the ballot may inelude the level of
professionalization o f the state legislature. Although “weakness” as deseribed by Thelen
and Steinmo (1994) may lack conceptual clarity, the point is nevertheless clear: as
legislatures professionalize, the relationship between the institutions changes such that
initiatives appear to be more appealing to actors in the political arena. Additionally, other
veto points exist: clearly, qualifieation difficulty o f the initiative process strongly predicts
the frequency o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots.

Conclusions
This chapter has focused on testing two main hypotheses via statistieal analysis.
Statistical and substantive significance were found for the first hypothesis, and while
limited statistical support was found for the seeond hypothesis, the results were
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nonetheless substantive in nature. The results from this model, which has been expanded
over prior models reviewed in the discipline, confirm many previous findings, adding to
their robust nature. Moreover, by applying the theoretical framework that focuses on the
causes o f institutional change within the context o f the structure o f the institutions
themselves, this chapter has provided additional explanations regarding the frequency
and type o f statewide initiatives appearing on statewide ballots. The concluding chapter
will discuss this notion in the larger context o f direct democracy as developed in chapter
two.
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CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The study o f direct democracy in America has received considerable attention by
scholars over the last few decades.

The nature o f these works has generally been

outcome oriented; in other words, attention has focused primarily on the factors that
contribute to certain initiatives having success on the ballot. For example, the role of
interest groups, and in particular, their background, power, and ability mobilize resources
has been the focus o f many scholars. Indeed, with regards to interest groups, a eonsensus
among scholars exists; broad-based interest groups have considerably more success in
passing initiatives that modify the status quo, while narrow material interest groups, such
as trial lawyer associations, are more successful in countering initiatives. Moreover,
scholars have found that initiatives that threaten minority rights are more likely to be
successful in areas where the eleetorate is considered to be more homogeneous than
usual, or in municipalities where the electorate as a whole is smaller. Still focusing on
outcomes, other scholars have determined that economic initiatives are more likely to fail
when the overall economic trends are considered negative.
The focus on outcomes, and thus, on direct democracy as a policy-making institution,
is a worthwhile pursuit. However, this thesis contributes to the diseipline by first
considering the expectations of the “founders” o f direct democracy, the viability o f those
expectations, and then by considering how those expeetations have (or have not) been
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realized by today’s practitioners. The work presented here is designed to be viewed
alongside the outeome-oriented literature, rather than as a work that is eritieal or
supportive o f such literature. The current ehapter seeks to synthesize this thesis, and
discuss its overall eontribution to the discipline.

Discussion
State legislatures are professionalizing. As discussed in the first ehapter, the
consequences o f this professionalization are numerous: increased professionalization is
found to be correlated with increased public contact with representatives, inereases in
legislator diversity, and increased autonomy in initiating policies. As legislatures
professionalize, institutional changes occur that force other actors in the political arena to
adopt new strategies. In particular, interest groups that seek to either change or maintain
the status quo may need to consider using the initiative to aehieve policy success rather
than focus on a state legislature that has developed inereased autonomy. At the same
time, citizens who find themselves living in a state with the initiative available to them
may be able to quiekly and decisively remedy what is pereeived to be an over-aetive, or
under-aetive, state legislature. These policies may have the added effeet of not only
affecting policy, but o f affecting how policies are made by the state legislators
themselves. For example, an eleetorate who sueeessfully passes tax-and-expenditure
limitations are, in a sense, removing much o f the autonomy that was available to the
government. Sueh broad-based movements on the part o f the eitizens lack much of the
deliberation and foresight that would oeeur among (hopefully) seasoned lawmakers; but
at the same time, they also come without sueh things as log-rolling maneuvers by state
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legislators. At the same time, their intent is to prevent future baek-room deal-making by
state legislators, by instrueting the institution on what it exactly can and cannot do.
The notion that the people, at least in initiative states, are able to retain the authority
to pass laws that restriet the movements o f those that they have eleeted to represent them
is elearly within line o f the expeetations o f both the Populists and the Progressives who
founded this movement a eentury ago. Intent on eschewing party polities, these groups
sought to return authority to the people - and there is hardly a better test of authority o f
the people than the ability to direetly eontrol those who govern. Devoid of sueh Populist
notions as attempts to replace representative government with direct democracy, the
institution has enjoyed considerable popularity. Moreover, the societal problems left in
the wake o f the Industrial Revolution - a major catalyst in the induetion o f direet
demoeraey as an institution - had the ability to be addressed by direct democracy. While
the Progressives’ intent was for the soeietal problems to be solved, this may have been
overreaehing; solving problems is not always the goal o f government’, insofar as solving
requires the ability to know preeisely how polieies are going to affect different groups in
the future^. However, dealing with problems should be at least one o f the functions of
government, and in this way, the Progressive notion has been realized - at least within
states that have the initiative process available to them. As the statistical analysis in the
last chapter showed, the eoncept o f “dealing with problems” is also a function o f political
culture: given states with different eultures, those in the traditionalistic culture are less
likely to consider the initiative than are those in moralistic states. Thus, the institution has

’ The term “government” in this sense refers to the notion o f the people using plebiseitary
methods to govern.
^ As Danish physieist Niels Bohr points out, “predietion is very difficult, especially about
the future.”
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progressed from a method o f returning authority to the people in terms o f the
governmental process to one o f maintaining and reserving authority to the people in
terms o f the governmental process.

Limitations of the Study/Areas for Future Research
The work presented here has extended the work o f other scholars by utilizing
different control variables and operationalization methods, as well as surveying different
time periods. For the most part, the results o f this study confirm the results o f prior
studies. Few studies are free from limitations, and this study is not immune. First, as the
analysis developed, the sample size decreased considerably. This was due in part to the
exclusion o f Nebraska and Illinois from both models, and Alaska from the second model.
Thus, this study could benefit from an increased sample by extending the years in
initiatives appeared on statewide ballots.
Secondly, the secondary model that considered the type o f initiative may not have
been fully specified. In other words, because the emphasis diverged from simple
frequency analysis to type o f initiative, other factors may need to be considered in order
to fully understand the causes o f variance. In particular, as LeLoup (1978) argues,
legislative professionalism does not automatically equate to legislative capacity. Because
of this, future research may consider the types o f legislation considered by the legislature
in the context o f state-level public opinion. This variable may better able to predict the
type o f initiatives appearing on statewide ballots as a better predictor o f dissatisfaction
with the policies emanating from the state legislature. However, a recurring problem in
state-level analysis is the notion that public opinion may vary widely across states;
California and Nevada are prime examples o f this phenomena.
IIS

Third, this study may have benefited from an expanded analysis o f state legislative
professionalism. That is, this thesis has considered only those states that have the
initiative

process

available,

and

the

corresponding

state

levels

o f legislative

professionalism. By evaluating states that do not have the initiative available to them, as
well as the corresponding levels of state legislative professionalism, a broader pattern
may have emerged showing that highly professional legislatures were more common in
states that did not have the process, thereby suggesting that these states did not sense a
need to circumvent the legislature. Though proper control variables would have to be
considered, such a finding could cast doubt on the notion that legislative professionalism
is universally associated with increased ballot initiative activity.
Finally, future researchers would do well to consider, in addition to the type o f
initiatives considered on statewide ballots, whether or not the initiative modifies or
maintains the status quo. As legislatures professionalize, divergences in public opinion
regarding the (perceived) increases in output may result in differences in the objective of
initiatives that are not captured with a simple measure o f type. Understanding the
correlation between legislative professionalism, the type o f initiatives passed in a given
state, as well as whether or not the initiatives maintained or altered the status quo, would
increase our overall understanding o f the relationship between the institution of the state
legislatures and direct democracy.

Conclusions
The current study has considered the institution o f direct democracy in a broad,
comparative sense in order to gain insight into the overall status o f the institution, as
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compared with the genesis o f the institution itself. In so doing, the study has produced a
number o f contributions to the discipline.
First, analysis o f the literature suggests that the expectations o f the founders o f direct
democracy regarding the educative effects o f the institution may not have been met. In
arguing that direct democracy would enhance citizen engagement, political knowledge, as
well as heighten the political efficacy o f the citizenry, the Progressives may have been
overly dependent upon the institution as an instigating force in producing the results
without fully considering the desires o f the citizens themselves. The process o f direct
democracy cannot, in and o f itself, automatically produce changes in the citizenry.
Though the institution may give the opportunity for the citizens to become more engaged
and knowledgeable, the outcome is still up to the people and their choice to take the
action necessary to become more engaged and knowledgeable.
Secondly, broad examinations o f the literature regarding interest groups and direct
democracy show distinctive patterns. First, interest group activity increases in states that
allow direct democracy. Secondly, broad-based interest groups often have more success
at placing initiatives on the ballots, while narrow-material interest groups often have
more success at defeating ballot initiatives. Thus, the notion o f the Progressives that
direct democracy would be able to “neutralize” the power o f special-interest influence
over the policymaking process (and primarily over the state legislature) has also not been
met. However, this may once again be a case o f overreaching on the part o f the
Progressives. The belief that interest groups may be co-opting the policymaking process
is often a function o f the beholder’s beliefs. Thus, the Progressive notion that interest
groups should not be able to exert influence over the policymaking process may have
largely stemmed from a belief that their own interests were not largely represented by
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powerful interest groups. Indeed, by organizing initial groups with the purpose of
instituting functions such as direct democracy (e.g., the Farmer’s Alliance), Populists and
Progressives were, in many ways, creating an interest group focused on breaking the
power o f other interest groups. Ideally, the Progressive notion could have been limited to
increasing the openness or transparency o f the process (and direct democracy could still
have been a method o f achieving this) in an effort to increase the plurality o f interest
groups. This o f course, lacks the panache o f a platform calling for the destruction of
“powerful special interest pressure groups” and would have likely resulted in fewer
followers.
Third, the literature considering policy outcomes and direct democracy has revealed
that, for the most part, policies in states with the initiative are more in line with the public
opinion than those in non-initiative states. Moreover, studies reveal that minority rights
are rarely (though not never) infringed upon through the process o f direct democracy.
This relationship, however, does not hold in municipal-level elections. Though the
expectations o f the founders o f direct democracy are not widely articulated on these
issues, it seems clear that these outcomes are, in the least, not contradictory.
Fourth, the statistical analyses presented here show that increased legislative
professionalism, in terms of staff, compensation, and session time, are associated with
increased initiative activity, when holding other factors, such as qualification difficulty
and interest group strength, constant. Thus, the study supports previous findings, as well
as their explanations, that the relationship may be a function o f increased policy agendas
within more professional legislatures, as well as a function o f the relationship between
interest groups and state legislators.
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Finally, this thesis suggests that the relationship between direct democracy and state
legislatures may be well informed by the institutionalist theory. More specifically, the
theoretical expectations o f institutional dynamism suggest that veto points occur within
the institutions that populate the political arena, and that (rational) political actors attempt
to pursue their own agenda by exploiting these veto points. Considering individuals or
groups attempting to place initiatives on the ballot as the rational actors pursuing goals,
such veto points may become apparent at different levels o f legislative professionalism
across states, especially within the context o f other variables, such as qualification
difficulty, divided government situations, and differences in the economic conditions or
public opinion regarding a particular policy. These components, occurring together but
necessarily in tandem, function as considerations to individuals or groups considering an
initiative, and ultimately, serve as explanatory predictors of changes via direct
democracy.
In conclusion, untangling the complications and paradoxes involved in the study of
direct democracy is far from complete. The institution is capable o f aggregating citizen
policy desires into actual policies, and as such, may be beneficial to the overall political
process. While the long-term implications of many policies (such as tax-and-expenditure
limitations) may be questioned, especially in terms of overall school funding levels and
other social programs, the wishes of the majority o f the (voting) population are still the
deciding factor in lawmaking in America. Assuming that participation includes a majority
o f the population, however, is another consideration entirely.
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APPENDIX I
Categorization o f Initiatives

NCSL’S Designation:

New Category:

Agriculture
Banking and Financial Services
Budget and Tax - Federal
Budgets - State
Commerce and Economic Development
Energy and Electric Utilities
Gambling and Lotteries
Insurance
Labor and Employment
Telecom and Info Tech
Transportation

(1) Economic Issues

Arts and Culture
Civil and Constitutional Law
Criminal Justice
Education
Environmental Protection
Health
Human Services
Juvenile Justice
Natural Resources

(2) Social/Moral Initiatives

Elections and Redistricting
Federalism
Judiciary
Legislatures
State and Local Government
Tax and Revenue - State

(3) Governmental Process Initiatives
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APPENDIX II
Coding o f Religious Denominations

New Category:

ARIS Designation

Assemblies o f God
Apostolic Faith
Baptist
Church o f Christ
Church o f God
Pentecostal

(1) Evangelical

Congregationalist
Methodist
Episcopalian
Disciples o f Christ
Unitarian/Universalist
Protestant
Presbyterian
American Lutheran Church
Lutheran Church in America

(2) Mainline

No Religion
Buddhist
Refused
Jehovah’s Witness
Mormon/LDS
Other
Jewish
Nondenominational
Muslim/Islamic

Not Coded
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